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While the jurisdiction of the federal court over a case in which the conditions of
the Acts of Congress relative to the removal of causes, have been complied with,
cannot be defeated by any action or omission of the state court, yet it is the duty of
the state court before relinquishing its jurisdiction to be satisfied that those conditions have been complied with.
The decision of an inferior state court upon the question of its own jurisdiction
is subject to review by the highest court of the state, and this in turn by the
Supreme Court of the United States; but the decision of the state courts is not subordinate to the opinion of 'any other federal tribunal.
a petition for
The Act of March 3d 1875, providing that either party may file
removal without any affidavit, "before or at the term at which the cause could be first
tried, and before the trial thereof," does not take away the right of a citizen of
another state, under sect. 639 of the Revised Statutes, to remove a cause at any
time before trial, on making an affidavit of his belief and reason to believe that
from prejudice or local influence he will not be able to obtain justice in the state
court.
A hearing before an auditor who determines nothing finally and whose report is
only prima facie evidence upon a trial before the court or jury, is not a trial within
the meaning of the Acts of Congress.
EXCEPTIONS to an order of the Superior Court removing the
record and proceedings to the Circuit Court of the United States.
D.

W. Bond, for plaintiff

C. Delano, for defendant
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRAY, C. J.-Among the provisions of former Acts of Congress, concerning the removal of causes from the state courts to
the federal courts, which are substantially re-enacted in the Revised Statutes of the United States, axe those of the Act of March

2d 1867, by which any suit commenced in any court of a state
between a citizen of that state and a citizen of another state, in
which the amount in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum
or value of $500; may be removed for trial into the Circuit Court
of the United States next to be holden for the district in which
the suit is pending, upon the petition of the citizen of the other
state, whether he be plaintiff or defendant, filed "at any time
before the trial or final hearing of the suit," and supported by his
affidavit that he has reason to believe and does believe that from
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prejudice or local influence he will not be able to obtain justice in
the state court, and upon his offering good and sufficient surety for
his entering in the Circuit Court, on the first day of its sessitm,
copies of the process against him, and of all pleadings and proceedings in the cause, and for his appearance there. The act
provides that "it shall thereupon be the duty of the state court to
accept the surety and to proceed no further in the cause against
the petitioner ;" and that, "when the said copies are entered as
aforesaid in the Circuit Court, the cause shall there proceed in the
same manner as if it had been brought there by original process,"
and the copies of pleadings shall have the same force and effect as
the originals: U. S. Rev. Sts., sect. 639, c. 3.
As appears by the authorities cited by the learned counsel foi
the defendant, if'the case is within the Act of Congress, and the
proper petition, affidavit and surety are filed in the state court,
the Circuit Court of the United States takes jurisdiction of the
cause, although the state court omits or even refuses to make any
order for its removal. In other words, the jurisdiction of the
federal court over a case in which the conditions of the Act of
Congress have been complied with cannot be defeated by any
action or omission of the state court.
On the other hand, it is the duty of the state court, before
relinquishing jurisdiction, of a cause once lawfully brought before
it, and discharging that cause from its own docket, to be satisfied
that there has been a compliance with those conditions. If the
highest court of the state errs in holding that the petitioner is not
entitled to remove the cause, its judgment may be revised and
reversed on writ of error by the Supreme Court of the United
States, and all proceedings had in the courts of the state after due
application for a removal, may be ordered by that court to be set
aside. But no Act of Congress, and no adjudication of the
Supreme Court of the United States, has made the opinion of
the state court, upon the question whether its own jurisdiction
must be surrendered, subordinate to the opinion of any federal
tribunal below the Supreme Court.
It is, to say the least, a matter of grave doubt whether the

Circuit Court of the United States, in such a case as this, could
issue a writ of mandamus or of certiorari to the state court; and,
if it could, it would only be when no copy of the record had been
filed in the Cireuit Court, and to obtain such a copy for the purVOL. XXIX.-4

STONE v. SARGENT.

pose of guiding its own proceedings, and not to restrain or control
the judicial action of the state court: Ex parte Turner, 8 Wail.,
Jr. 258; Murray v. Patrie, 5 Blatchf. C. C. 243; s. c. cited 6
Id. 382-386; s. c. nom. Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274, 276
note; Hough v. Western Transportation Co., 1 Biss. 425; In re
Gromie, 2 Id. 160; Osgood v. Chicago, Danville JVincennes
Railroad, 6 Id. 330; Scott v. Clinton & Springfield Railroad,6
Id. 529; United States v. McKee, 4 Dill. 1.
In Dillon on Removal of Causes (2d ed.) 77-79, it is said that
the Circuit Court of the United States has the power to protect its
suitors by injunction against a judgment rendered in the state
court after a proper application to remove the cause. But the
only authority there cited is French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250, in
which the circumstances were very peculiar, and the judgment
in no way supports the position of the learned author. In that
case, the principal cause had been removed without objection from
a state court of Virginia into the Circuit Court of the United
States, and the state court of Virginia had not undertaken to
retain jurisdiction thereof. The injunction issued by the federal
court was not against proceeding with the original suit in the state
court of Virginia, but against prosecuting a new suit, commenced
in the courts of another state after the right of removal had been
perfected, upon a decree rendered in the state court of Virginia
before the application for removal. The judgment is limited by its
language, as well as by the facts before the court, to injunctions to
stay suits commenced after the jurisdiction of the federal court
has attached, and in any other view would be inconsistent not
only with the clear terms of the Acts of Congress, but with earlier
and later decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
U. S. St., March 2d 1793, sect. 5; U. S. Rev. Sts., sect. 720;
.Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch 179; Watson v. Jone, 13 Wall.
679, 719; Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S. 254; Dialv. RZeynolds,
96 Id. 340. See also BRADLEY, J., in Live Stock Association v.
CrE!8ent City 0o., 1 Abbott U. S. 388, 404-407; s. c. 1 Woods
21, 34-36.
The inconvenience of the construction for which the defendant
contends may be made more apparent by applying it to a case in
which the amount in dispute is more than 8500 and less than
$5000. Such a case, in the event of a decision in the highest
court of the state against a right claimed under the Act of Con-
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gress, could be taken by writ of error to the Supreme Court of
the United States: U. S. Rev. Sts., sect. 709. But the decision
of the Circuit Court of the United States could not be re-examined
in the Supreme Court: U. S. Rev. Sts., sect. 691; U. S. St.,
'February 16th 1875, sect. 3. So that the effect would be to make
the decision of the Circuit Court of the United States paramount
to the deliberate judgment of the highest court of the state.
This court has uniformly held that any court of the Commonwealth, before declining the further exercise of jurisdiction over a
cause, must consider and determine whether, upon the record and
papers before it, the petitioner has brought himself within the Acts
of Congress; and that the ruling of a judge of this court or of the
Superior Court upon that question may be revised in the full
bench of this court upon bill of exceptions or report of the judge:
Commonwealth v. Casey, 12 Allen 214; Morton v. Mutual Ins.
Co., 105 Mass. 141; Bryant v. Bich, 106 Id. 180; 1lorence
Sewing Sewing Machine Co. v. Grover & Baker Co., 110 Id. 70;
Mahone v. Manchester & Lawrence Railroad,111 Id. 72; Galpin
v. Critchlow, 112 Id. 339; .Du Vivier v. Hopkins, 116 Id. 125;
New York Warehouse Co. v. Loomis, 122 Id. 431. And, notwithstanding some dicta of the learned justice who delivered the
opinion in Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214, 223, having an
opposite tendency, the practice of this court in this regard is
upheld by many decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, of which it will be sufficient to cite a few of the more
recent.
In -lorence Sewing Machine 0o. v. Grover & Baker Co., 110
Mass. 70, a defendant filed a petition for a removal of the case
into the Circuit Court of the United States under the Act of
Congress of 1867, which was refused by a justice of this court,
upon the ground that the case was not within the act; and upon
exceptions to such refusal, and to his rulings at the subsequent
trial, his decision was affirmed by the full court. The case was,
nevertheless, entered in the Circuit Court of the United States,
and a motion of the plaintiff to remand it was overruled by that
court: 1 Holmes C. C. 235. But the Supreme Court of the
United States, on a writ of error to this court, affirmed its judgment, without a suggestion that there was any irregularity in its
proceedings, or that it had lost its jurisdiction of the case by the
entry thereof in the Circuit Court: 18 Wall. 553.
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So in Bryant v. Rich, 106 Alass. 180, a justice of the Superior
Court declined to grant a petition for removal under the same Act
of Congress, on the ground that it was filed too late; and exceptions were taken to his decision and were overruled by this court.
The Supreme Court of the United States, upon writ of error, held,
in the words of Chief Justice WAITu, that "the transfer was properly refused," and affirmed the judgment: Vannevar v. Bryant,
21 Wall. 41. A similar decision was made upon a writ of error
to the Supreme Court of Iowa in Railroad Co. v. McKinley, 99
U. S. 147.
In Fashnacht v. Frank,23 Wall. 416, an alien, whose property
had been ordered, by a decree of a District Court of the state of
Louisiana, to be sold at the suit of a citizen of that state holding a
mortgage thereon, obtained from the same court a temporary
injunction, which, upon hearing, was dissolved; and afterwards
filed a petition, under the Act of Congress of July 27th 1866, for
the removal of the case into the Circuit Court of the United
States, which was refused, and he then appealed from the decree
dissolving the injunction to the Supreme Court of Louisiana,
which affirmed that decree. The Chief Justice of the United
States, in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court dismiss.
ing for want of jurisdiction a writ of error to the state court, said
that the petition for removal "was at once very properly overruled,
for the reason that a final judgment had already been rendered,"
and that the appeal to the Supreme Court of the state "was
clearly the appropriate remedy for the correction of the errors of
the District Court, if there were any."
In another case, a defendant's petition for removal under the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which alleged the citizenship of the plaintiff at the date of the petition, but not at the time of the commencement of the action, was for that reason refused by the
Supreme Court of the state of New York, and its judgment
affirmed in the Court of Appeals: Pechner v. Pheniz In Jo.,
6 Lansing 411, and 65 N. Y. 195. The case was taken by writ
of error to the Supreme Court of the United States; and it was
there argued that the compliance with the conditions of the Act of
Congress ousted the Supreme Court of New York of its jurisdiction, and all further proceedings therein were void. But the
judgment was affirmed; the chief justice saying, "This right of
removal is statutory. Before a party can avail himself of it, he
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must show upon the record that his is a case which comes within
the provisions of the statute. His p,.etition for removal, when filed,
becomes a part of -the record in the cause. It should state facts
which, taken in connection with such as already appear, entitle
him to the transfer. If he fails in this, he has not, in law, shown
to the court that it cannot 'proceed further with the cause.'
Having once acquired jurisdiction, the court may proceed until it
is judicially informed that its power over the cause has been
suspended." "The court had the right to take the case as made
by the party himself, and not inquire further. If that was not
sufficient to oust the jurisdiction, there was no reason why the
court might not proceed with the cause :" 95 U. S. 183. A like
decision was made where petitions under the Act of 1867 contained
defective allegations of the citizenship of the adverse party; and
the chief justice said, "Holding, as we do, that a state court is not
bound to surrender its jurisdiction upon a petition for removal
until at least a petition is filed, which, upon its face, shows the
right of the petitioner to the transfer, it was not error for the
court to retain these causes:" Amory v. Amory, 95 U. S. 186e
In the very recent case of Afeyer v. Construction Co., 100 U.
S. 457, a defendant in an inferior court of the state of Iowa
filed a petition under the Act of Congress of March 3d 1875, for
a removal of the cause into the Circuit Court of the United States.
The state court refused the petition, because one of the two sureties
on the bond offered was an attorney of the court, who was forbidden by the law and practice of Iowa to be a surety; and because
the petition was filed too late, after the trial had begun. The
defendant, notwithstanding, obtained from the clerk a copy of the
record, and filed it in the Circuit Court of the United States, and
that court overruled a motion of the plaintiff to remand the cause.
The state court, against the protest of the defendant, proceeded
with the cause, and entered a final decree for the plaintiff, and the
defendant appealed therefrom to the Supreme Court of the state,
which affirmed that decree. The cause also proceeded in the Circuit Court of the United States, and there resulted in a decree for
uhe defendant. The matter was brought before the Supreme Court
of the United States by writ of error to the state court, and by
appeal from the decree of the federal court. The Supreme Court
of the United States held that the cause was legally removed,
because one of the sureties was admitted to be sufficient and the
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Act of Congress did not require more than one, and because upon
the facts appearing on the record the trial had not begun when the
petition for removal was filed; and that the defendant had not, by
taking part under protest in the subsequent proceedings in the
state court, waived his right to insist that the cause had been so
removed. The Supreme Court, on the writ of error, reversed the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa, and remanded the cause
to that court with instructions to reverse the decision of the inferior
court of the state, and to direct that court to proceed no further
with the suit; and, on the appeal, reversed the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States upon the merits, and remanded
the cause for further proceedings in that court. But no suggestion
was made that the state court bad no authority, for the purpose of
ascertaining whether it should retain jurisdiction of the cause, to
consider whether the provisions of the Act of Congress had been
complied with. On the contrary, the chief justice, in delivering
judgment, clearly implied that if the sufficiency of the surety, or
the citizenship of either party, had been denied in point of fact,
the state court might have inquired into it, and added, "We filly
recognise the principle, heretofore asserted in many cases, that the
state court is not required to let go its jurisdiction until a case is
made, which, upon its face, shows that the petitioner can remove
the cause as a matter of right."
The bill of exceptions allowed by the chief justice of the Superior Court to his order granting the petition for a removal of the
cause into the Circuit Court of the United States is therefore
rightly before us, and the motion to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction must be denied. But, upon consideration of the exceptions,
we are of opinion that they cannot be sustained.
The petition for removal was filed "before the trial" of the suit
in the state court, as required by the U. S. Rev. Sts., sect.
639, cl. 3; and we concur in the opinion, which has been expressed by Mr. Justice MILLER, and, so far as we are iDformed, by
every other federal judge who has had occasion to decide the question, that the Act of Congress of March 3d 1875, which provides
that, in any suit between citizens of different states, either party
may file a petition for removal, without any affidavit, "before or at
the term at which said cause could be first tried and before the
trial thereof," and which repeals only such acts and parts of acts
as are in conflict with its provisions, has not taken away the right
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of a citizen of another state to remove a suit between himself and
a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought, at any time
before the trial, upon making affidavit of his belief and reason to
believe that from prejudice or local influence he will not be able to
obtain justice in the state court: Dillon on Removal of Causes 29 ;
Arapahoe County v. Kansas Pacific Bailway, 4 Dill. 277, 287;
Cooke v. Ford, 16 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 417; Whitehouse v.
Continental Insurance Co., 2 Fed. Rep. 498. See, also, Bible
Society v. Grove, 101 U. S. 610.
The hearing before an auditor, who determines nothing finally,
but whose report is, by the Gen. Sts., c. 121, sect. 46, only
prima facie evidence upon a subsequent trial before the court
or jury, is not a trial, within the meaning of the Acts of Congress;
and consent to the appointment of an auditor is no waiver of the
right to remove before trial under the U. S. Rev. Sts., sect. 639,
cl. 3. In Hanover Bank v. Smith, 13 Blatch. C. C. 224, cited
for the plaintiff, the party who was held to have waived his right
of removal bad consented, upon the case being called for trial in
court, and in order to avoid such trial, that it should be tried by a
referee named.
Exceptions overruled.
Since the publication of the note to
Taylor v. Rock-efdler, in 18 Am. Law
Reg., N. S. 310, the law relating to Removal of Causes has been the subject of
constant consideration in the federal,
and to some extent, in the state courts.
In this note an endeavor will be made
to group the cases in their appropriate
connections.
I. Perhaps the most important question arising under the Act of March 3d
1875, 18 Stat. at Large, part 3, p.
470, is the construction of the second
section of the act which entitles either
party to remove a cause in certain cases
of diverse citizenship. By-this act, the
right cf removal is given in any suit in
which there is "a controversy between
citizens of different states." The meaning of this phrase has now been settled
by a majority of the Supreme Court
(SwAYNE, STRONG and BRADLEY, JJ.,
dissenting, and HuN , J., absent), in

the Reemoval Cases, 10 Otto 457; but
before that decision there was great
divergence in the opinion of the judges
called upon to interpret the act. The
views expressed by Mr. Justice BRADLT.T, in his dissenting opinion, had been
those previously adopted in several of
the Circuit Courts.
This view, in substance, was that by
the Act of March 3d 1875, Congress
had intended to confer upon the Circuit%
Courts all the jurisdiction which it was
possible to confer under the constitution,
art. 3, sect. 2, and that the act was
to be construed liberally; and that,
therefore, in all cases of diverse citizenship, irrespective of the question whether
some of the plaintiffs were of the same
citizenship with some of the defendants,
the cause was one which might be removed. The arguments in support of
this construction of the act are so fully
stated in the opinion of Justice BRAD-
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LuT, 10 Otto 479, that they are worthy
of quotation:. " This portion of the act
gives the right of removal to either
party, in any suit in which there is "a
controversy between citizens of different
In my judgment a controstates."
versy is such, as that expression is used
in the constitution, and in the law, when
any of the parties on one side thereof
are citizens of a different state or states
from that of which any of the parties
on the other side are citizens. It is true,
if there are other parties on opposite
sides of the controversy who are citizens
of a common state, it may also be a controversy between citizens of the same
state. In other words, a controversy
may be, at the same time, both a controversy between citizens of the same state,
and between citizens of different states.
But the fact that it is both, does not take
away th. federal jurisdiction. Neither
the constitution, nor the law, declares
that there shall not be such jurisdiction
it any of the contestants on opposite
sides of the controversy are citizens of
the same state; but they do declare that
there shall be such jurisdiction if the
controversy is between citizens of different states. The gift of judicial power
by the constitution, and the gift of jurisdiction by the law, are in affirmative
terms; and those terms include as well
the case when only part of the contestants opposed to each other are citizens
of different states, as that in which they
are all of different states. And I see
no reason why both the constitution and
the law should not receive a construction
as broad as that of the terms which they
employ. * * * It seems to me clear
that in construing the present law, we
not bound by the construction given to
the old Judiciary Act. The words of
that act conferring jurisdiction upon the
Circuit Courts in respect of citizenship,
were not the same as those used by the
present law or by the constitution. It
only conferred jurisdiction when "the
suit is between a cittzen of the state

where the suit is brought, and a citizen
of another state." The singular number only was used; and the courts in
applying the law to cases in which there
was a plurality of the plaintiffs or defendants, construed it (perhaps justly),
as requiring that each plaintiff and each
defandant should have the citizenship
required by the law. But now it is not
so. The present law follows the words
of the constitution, and gives jurisdiction
to the Circuit Courts in the broadest
terms, namely, whenever in any suit,
there is "a controversy between citizens
of different states," and this broad and
general expression, as I think I have
shown, gives jurisdiction where any of
the contestants on opposite sides of the
controversy are citizens of different
states."
In Girardey v. Moore, 3 Woods 399,
the same judge had said, "1The Act of
1875, undoubtedly, greatly enlarges the
class of cases which may be removed
from the state to the federal courts.
Before this, Congress had never invested
the federal courts with jurisdiction arising from diverse citizenship, co-extensive
with the judicial power conferred upon
the general government. Subject to a
limitation as to the amount in controversy, this was attempted to be done by
that act. The true interpretation of this
statute involves the true interpretation of
the constitutional power. The jurisdiction given to the Circuit Court is as
broad 4s the judicial power." Though
these views have been decided to be
erroneous, they may have an historical
interest hereafter. An opinion of Buim,
J., in Sudon v. Keokvk Packet Co.,
1 Fed. Rep. 789, is instructive in this
connection; in speaking of the second
section of the act, he says, "It Rpems a
self-evident proposition that the first
clause adopting as it does the language
of the constitution, which is the onry
source of power in such cases, confers
all the jurisdiction which it was competent for Congress to confer on the federal
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courts, except, perhaps, that the right
of removal under that clause attaches to
the party plaintiff or defendant, so that
where somne are residents and some nonresidents, all might have to join in the
application, which is not the case under
the second clause. It might be claimed
that the second clause amounts to a
legislative construction of the first, that
it does not include a case where some of
the defendants* or plaintiffs are nonresidents, but one or more reside in the
state with the opposite party. But it is
not to be presumed that Congress used
the language of the constitution in a
different sense from that in which the
framers of that instrument used it, or
that Congress, in the second clause,
intended to provide for cases not covered
by the constitutional provision. The
effect of the second clause is to allow a
removal in the class of cases therein
described on the application of one or
more plaintiffs or defendants without the
concurrence of the others. There is
nerhaps another effect to be given to the
second clause. It manifestly provides
for the same class of cases as is provided
for in the law of 1866, but instead of
allowing a severance of the cause it
takes the whole case to this court, and
the decisions thus far are to the effect
that in this respect it supersedes the law
of 1866. Taking the section together,
it would appear that it was the intention
of Congress in all cases where there is a
controversy between citizens of different
states, which is joint and indivisible in
its nature, to allow a removal on the
applieation of the party plaintiff or defendant. And when there are several
controversies in the same suit that are
properly severable in their character, to
allow a removal on the application of
any one or more of the plaintiffs or
defendants actually interested in any
one of such controversies, and who may
reside in a state other than the one in
which the other party to such controversy
resides."
VOL. XXIX.-5

The opinion of Nxxow, J., in Buckman v. Ruckman, 1 Fed. Rep. 587, tends
in the same direction.
But the question is row settled by the
Remora! Cases, supra, contrary to these
opinions. The opinion of WAITE, C. J.,
may be regarded as the guide for future
cases. He says, after quoting the act,
"This, we understand to mean that
when the controversy about which a suit
in the state court is brought, is between
citizens of one or more states on one
side, and citizens of other states on the
other side, either party to the controversy
may remove the suit to the Circuit Court,
without regard to the position they
occupy in the pleadings as plaintiffs or
defendants. For the purpose of a removal the matter in dispute may be
ascertained, and the parties to the suit
arranged on opposite sides of that dispute. If, in such arrangement, it appears that those on one side are all
citizens of different states from those on
the other, the suit may be removed.
Under the old law the pleadings only
were looked at, and the rights of the
parties in respect to a removal were
determined solely according to the position they occupied as plaintiffs or defendants in the suit: Coal Co. v. Blatchford,
11 Wall. 174. Under the new law the
mere form of the pleadings may be put
aside, and the parties placed on different
sides of the matter in dispute according
to the facts, this being done, when all
those on one side desire a removal, it
may be had, if the necessary citizenship
exists."
The difference in the construction thus
given to the Act of March 3d 1875,
from that given to previous acts, is, that
though the controversy must still be
between opposing parties of entirely
different states, the court will arratige
the parties upon opposing sides according to their actual relationship with the
case, and not confine the inquiry into
the relationship of the parties to me
formal statement of -the pleadings.
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In M'aden v. Skinner,- 11 Otto 577,
the principle' of the Removal Cases,
supra, was extended and applied to a
case where there were certain nominal
parties on the record who had no real
interest in the controversy. The existence of a common citizenship between
such nominal parties and some of their
opponents, was held not to destroy the
jurisdiction of the federal court.
In Ayers v. Chicago, 11 Otto 184, an
order of the Circuit Court remanding a
cause upon the ground that certain,
though not all, of the opposing parties
had a common citizenship, was aftfirmed.
The Circuit Court in New York seems
to have anticipated the statement of the
law thus announced by the Supreme
Court. In Sawyer v. Switzerland Marine
Insurance Co., 14 Blatch. 451, a cause
was remanded upon the ground that the
requisite jurisdictional citizenship must
exist as to each of the opposing parties,
and in Van Brunt v. Corbin, 14 Blatch.
496, the same doctrine was reiterated
with the qualification that where the
parties were nominal, the case would be
different. To the same effect is Donohue
v. Mariposa Land Co., 5 Sawyer 163.
Edgerton v. Gilpin, 3 Woods 277,
enunciates the same doctrine as Malden
v. Skinner, supra; and to the same effect
are Goodenough v. Warren, 5 Sawyer
494; Burke v. Rood, 1 Fed. Rep. 541,
and Ruble v. Hyde, 3 Id. 330.
In Bailey v. N'ew York Savings Bank,
2 Fed. Rep. 14, it was held, that where
a stakeholder is sued by a citizen of his
own state, and the fund is claimed by a
citizen of a different state, who is permitted to intervene as a party defendant,
the case is not properly removable to the
federal court. Upon a motion to remand, BLLTCHFORD, J., said, "There
is not in this case, as it now stands, any
controversy between citizens of different
states to which a defendant, citizen of
the same state as the plaintiff, is not a
necessary party, so as to make a case
within the first sub-division of sect. 2,

of the Act of 1875, nor any controvaly
which is wholly between citizens oi
different states, and which can be determined between them without the pres-.
ence of a defendant, citizen of the same
state with the plaintiff, actually interested in such controversy so as to make
a case within the second sub-division ot
sect. 2, of the Act of 1875. No case
is cited where a removal has been
allowed under sect. 2, under circum
stances such as those which exist in the
present case."
In Cissel v. McDonald, 16 Blatch.
150, a suit between a subject of Great
Britain and a citizen of the District
of Columbia, was remanded upon the
ground long ago settled in the Supreme
Court, that an inhabitant of the District
of Columbia is not a citizen of any state
within the meaning of the law.
In New Hampshire v. Grand Trunk
Railroad Co., 3 Fed. Rep. 887, it was
held, that a prosecution against an alien
criminal cannot be removed upon the
ground of alienage. In Lanz v. Randal, 4 Dill. 425, the question arose,
whether a statute of Minnesota, giving
to aliens the right to vote, made them
citizens. The court held, that the statute
could have no such effect, and, therefore,
a suit between such an alien, resident in
Minnesota, and a citizen of Minnesota
was removable to the federal court.
Where a case is properly removed,
upon the ground that the plaintiff was
an alien, the fact that after such removal.
he became a citizen of the same state as
the defendant, does not destroy the jurisdiction: Houser v. Clayton, 3 Woods
273. The same principle is recognised
in McLean v. St. Paul Railroad Co., 16
Blath. 309; Jackson v. Mutual Life
Insurance C., 3 Woods 413; and
Cook v. Whitney, 3 Id. 715, where it
was held that the citizenship at the
time of removal is the determining
citizenship, and hence, if he necessary citizenship exist at that time, the
citizenship of the parties at the begin-
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mug of the suit is immaterial. In the
latter case, it was also held that garnishees are not parties to the suit for the
purpose of settling questions of jurisdiction, and hence the fact that they are of
the same citizenship with the plaintiffs is
unimportant. In Ruckman v. Palisade
Land Co., I Fed. Rep. 367, the next
friend of a married woman was regarded
in the same liglt; the citizenship of the
married woman is the determining
citizenship, for the next friend is a
purely formal party.
In Waterbury v. City of Laredo, 3
Woods 371, a decision was made which
it is proper to notice, because if it is
correct in principle, the jurisdiction of
the federal courts will be enlarged in a
direction not heretofore contemplated.
The suit was upon a non-negotiable
instrument, made between citisens of the
same state, by an assignee, a citizen of a
different state. The right of removal
was sustained upon the ground, that the
clause contained in the latter part of the
first section of the Act of March 3d
1875, restricting the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Courts in suits brought by assignees, only applied to suits originally
brought in the Circuit Court, and had no
reference to cases removed under the
second section of the act. In other
words, a plaintiff having no right of
action to bring a suit in the federal court
could issue his writ in the state court,
obtain service upon the defendant, and
immediately remove the record to the
federal court for further proceedings.
Perhaps this decision is of no practical
importance in states like Pennsylvania,
where the common-law rule is in force,
that the assignee of a non-negotiable
instrument must bring suit in the name
of his assignor.
Before leaving this branch of the subject, it may be well to refer to Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Ketchum, 11 Otto 289,
where the court held that the same construction which they had given to the
second section of the Act of March 3d

1875, relating to the removal of causes
upon the ground of diverse citizenship,
was applicable to the first section of the
act relating to the original jurisdiction.
II. The second question to be considered, is that discussed in the prinAlthough the law upon
cipal case.
this subject cannot be said to have been
definitely settled, there are several
Circuit Court decisions which seem distinctly to deny the right of the state
courts, after the filing of the bond and
petition, to consider any question in the
case. The state courts generally have
taken the contrary view. In Ex parte
Grimball, 8 Central Law Journal 151,
the Supreme Court of Alabama takes
the same position as the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts. Portions of the opin"It
ion are worthy of quotation.
was contended in this cause that upon
the filing of a petition for removal and
offering a bond for costs, as prescribed
in the statute, by a person sued in a
state court, the jurisdiction of the court
ceased, and it must proceed no further
in such suit, and that it may not look
into the records and papers to ascertain
for itself whether or not the cause is of
that class or nature which the statute
authorizes to be transferred to the federal court. We are not unmindful of
the evils that may ensue from the exercise of a clashing jurisdiction by state
courts and courts of the United States
over the same parties and causes. It is
the duty of those tribunals to do all they
properly can to prevent such consequences. But that a state court shall be
paralyzed into impotency by the mere
presentation of the petition and bcnd of
a party sued therein, and be rendered
incompetent to inform itself by looking
into the record and papers on file,
whether the suit belongs to a removable
class, is, we think, an indefensible proposition. Why should a petition be presented at all if no response is to be made
to it, and it may not be considered?
According to the argument, it were fitter
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that the petition should be in form, as
well as in effect, a notice to the court
that the person filing it demanded that it
should no further interfere with him,
but transfer the cause by which he had
been brought there, to another jurisdicThe Acts of Congress
tion. * * *
particularly define the character of the
suits which may be removed and the
relation thereto and toward the other
parties, of the persons to whomthe privilege of removal is conceded. And it is
enacted that if, in any such suit, a party
entitled to remove it files his petition
and bond, &c., the state court shall proceed no further. It is only when those
conditions exist that the court is ousted
by law of its jurisdiction. By yielding
it in any other case, the court would not
be obeying the law, but submitting to the
demand of an individual, and whether
it is doing the one or the other, it cannot
know without so far looking into the
case as to ascertain whether it be removable or not under the law."
In Middleton v. Middleton's Executors,
7 Weekly Notes 144, a similar position
was taken.
The Supreme Court of the United
States have never had this question
directly presented to them, and have
declined to express any opinion upon it
when raised in argument. In Railroad
Co. v. .3IcKinley, 9 Otto 147, the state
court in Iowa proceeded to final hearing
of a case after a bond and petition for
removal had been filed at a time, which,
in their opinion, did not entitle the petitioner to a removal. The case being
taken by appeal from the Supreme Court
of the state to the Supreme Court
of the United States, the latter court,
being of opinion that the petition for
removal had not been filed in time,
affirmed the judgment of the state court.
From this case, though cited in the
principal case in support of the views
there expressed, no proper argument
can be maintained in favor of the asserted right of the state court, because

the appellant could reverse the daee of
the Supreme Court of Iowa only by
showing that some right guaranteed him
under the constitution or laws of the
United States had been denied to him.
and as, in fact, he had no right of removal, the state court had not deprived
him of any right by disregarding the
filing of the petition, and disposing of
the case upon its merits- The .Remoma
Cases, 10 Otto 457, cannot be regarded
as settling anything upon this point; the
chief justice very carefully limited his
opinion to the points involved in the case,
of which this was not one. The opinion
of Mr. Justice HARLAN, in the very re-

cent case of New Orleans Railroad Co.
v. Mississippi (U. S. S. C., Oct. Term
1880 not yet reported), may, perhaps.
be cited in this connection, in which he
says : "The inferior state court erred.
as well in not accepting the petition and
bond for the removal of the suit to the
Circuit Court of the United States, as
in thereafter proceeding to hear the
cause. It was entirely without jurisdiction to proceed after the presentation of
the petition and bond for removal."
In considering the effect of these words,
it must be borne in mind that they
were predicated upon a case, where the
petition for removal presented a case in
which the petitioner was entitled to a
removal; hence, nothing can be inferred
as to the right of the state court to proceed in a case where the petition in fact
does not present such a case. In this
case also, the court re-affirmed the do,
trine of Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall.
223, and Remoal Cases, 10 Otto 457,
that a party who contests a case upon its
merits in the state court after that court refused to recognise a petition for removal,
is not estopped from testing his right of
removal by a writ of error in the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Perhaps the most consistent view of
this subject is that expressed in Ex parte
Wells, 3 Woods 128, where the Circuit
Court takes the ground that, upon the
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dihng of the petition, the state court has afterwards is coram non judce, null and
the right to examine the petition and void. The question of the sufficiency
pass upon its sufficiency, but the federal of the bond itself, the competency of the
court, by virtue of its superior right to petition, the validity of the removal
try the case if subject to removal, is en- and each and all questions arising upon
titled to assert its jurisdiction by proper the petition, are taken away by this law
process directed to the state court. When from the state court, and reserved, by
this is done by the federal court, it will section five, for the United States Cirbe the duty of the state court and its cuit Court, to be passed upon in the
officers to yield obedience to the writs exercise of the unembarrassed and indifrom the federal court to effect such vidual jurisdiction which this act gives
removal. The court say: "The state it under the authority of the constitution
court surely is not bound to shut its eyes over "all controversies between citiaud yield to every application that comes zens of different states." So also it is
tW'it. Though removal when authorized said in Hunter v. Rioyal Canadian ln.
is a matter of right and not of favor, yet Co., 3 Hughes 234, "The reasons
the court must have the right to see which actuated the corporation court of
whether the application to remove comes Norfolk in refusing the motion of the
within the meaning of the law. I have defendants to remove are not conclusive
no doubt, however, that the Circuit with this court. The 5th section of the
Court, by virtue of its superior right to Act of Congress of March 3d 1875,
try the cause, if subject to removal, is relating to the removal of causes, conentitled to assert its jurisdiction by fers upon this court jurisdiction to deproper process directed to the state termine whether a cause be or be not
properly removed, and the 3d section
court."
The opposite view is distinctly ex- of the same act forbids the state court,
pressed in Cobb v. Globe Mutual Ins. after petition filed, to proceed any
Co., 3 Hughes 455, where it is said, further in the suit, whatever may be its
"Section three of the Judiciary Act of opinion on the sufficiency of the peti1875 makes the mere filing in the state tion, and makes all proceedings there,
court of the petition and bond, all that after petition for removal made and
is necessary to stay the proceedings of filed, null and void; unless indeed and
the state court, and makes it the duty until the cause shall be remanded again
if the state court, on this filing, to sus- to that court, after it has been brought
,end its proceedings. Section five, in by removal here." To the same effect
as plain terms as the English language is Connor v. Scott, 4 Dillon 242.
Whatever may be the right of the
affords, gives to the United States circuit
courts complete jurisdiction to determine state courts to examine the sufficiency
whether the suit was one that could of the bond and petition for the purpose
be properly removed, and to decide, of determining their future action in
after making such determination, what the case, whether to proceed or not, it
to do with the suit-whether to proceed seems clear that no order of removal
in it or to remand it to the state court, by the state court is necessary or proper.
or to dismiss it outright. * * * By the In Fulton v. Golden, 12 Chicago Leg.
filing of the petition and the bond in News 9, Nixox, J., says, "It was
the state court, showing that the con- suggested in the argument that the
cause should be remanded, because it
troversy is one between citizens of
different states, the jurisdiction of the did not appear that the state court made
state court from that moment ceases, an order of removal. There is nothing
and all that court can do in the matter in the Act of March 3d 1875, requiring
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such an order, and none is necessary."
And in Penrose v. Penrose, 1 Fed. Rep.
479, upon an attempt by the party
removing a cause to collect certain costs
allowed by the New York fec-bill for
obtaining an order of removal from the
court, the allowance was refused,
-zatc
BENEDICT,

J., saying,

"Upon

the

tiling of the petition and bond the state
court could proceed no further with the
cause. Au order of the state court
directing the removal of the cause, if
made, and an order refusing the removal would be equally without effect.
The power of the state court to make
any order whatever was gone, and by
necessary consequence its award of costs
against the plaintiff was void." To the
same effect is Commercial Bank v. Corbet, 5 Sawyer 172; and in this case the
court reiterated the right of the federal
court, by the remedies provided in the
act, to enforce the recognition of its
cognisance of the removed cause, which
were referred to in Ex parte Wells,
supra, if the state judges undertook to
dispute the right of removal.
It was decided In re Barnesville Railway Co., 4 Fed. Rep. 10, that after the
petition and bond are filed in the state
court, the federal court can do nothing
in the cause until the first day of the
term upon which the removing party is
bound to file the transcript of the record.
This decision is directly in conflict with
the decision of 1CKENNAXN, J., in Artlur

Co., 6 Weekly
v. New England Life fits.
Notes 403. The latter case, however,
seems to be more in accordance with the
law.
Upon the removal of a cause, the Circuit Court takes it up just at the point
where it was when the petition for removal was filed. In Duncan v. Gegan,
11 Otto 810, WAITE, C. J., says, "The
transfer of the suit from the state court
to the Circuit Court, did not vacatewhat
had been done in the statd court previous
to the removal. The Circuit Court when
a transfer is effected, takes the case in

the condition it was when the state court
was deprived of its jurisdiction. The
Circuit Court has no more power over
what was done before the removal, that
the state court would have -had if the
suit had remained there. It takes the
cs-e up where the state court left it off."
if after a removal the Circuit Court
remand the cause, this order is the subject of an appeal. The right of appeal
in this case is expressly given in section
5, of the Act of March 3d 1875, and
was recognised by the court in Ayers V
Chic i,, 11 Otto 184.
III. As to the form of petition. In
Conner v. Scott, 4 Dillon 242, and
Houser v. Clay/ton, 3 Wods 273, it was
held that the petition required no affidavit; in Dennis v. Alachua, 3 Woods
680, that the petition and affidavit accompanying it, might be made by an
In
attorney in fact of the petitioner.
Houser v. Clayton, supra, it was also
held, that the petition might be amended.
The several points just mentioned seem
to be supported by the Removal Cases,
10 Otto 457. The petitions, 'however,
must disclose distinctly the facts which
removal. Ex
entitle the party to tile
parte Anderson, 3 Woods 124. In all
cases which might be removed under the
Act of 1875, the bond provided for by
that act must be given, and even though
a case night have been removable, under
sect. 639, of the Revised Statutes, after
the passage of the Act of 1875, the removing party must give a bond for costs.
If lie fail so to do, the cause will be remanded: Torrey v. Locomotive Works,
14 Blatch. 269. But one desiring to
take advantage of defects in the form of
the bond or petition, must do so without
delay. In Hervey v. Illinois, Midland
Railway Co., 3 Fed. Rep. 707, a delay of
eighteen months was regarded as fatal,
and the defect treated as waived.
IV. When petition must be filed in
state court. The Act of Congress provides that the petition for removal is to
be filed at or before the term at which
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the cause could first have been tried in
the state court. This has been construed
to mean the first term after an issue of
fact has been made up, the first term
when the case could be tried in contemplation of law, not the first term when
the case might be reached upon the trial
list, which in a court with a crowded
calendar, might be several terms after an
isie had been framed. This was distinctly stated by WAiTE, C. J., in Gurney v. County of Brunswick, I Hughes
237, "A cause cannot be tried until in
some form an issue has been made up for
trial. as soon as the issue is made up, the
cause is ready for trial. The parties and
the courtmay not be ready, but the cause
is. The first term, therefore, at which a
case can be tried, is the first term at which
there is an issue for trial. An applicacation for removal to be made in time,
must be made before or at this term."
These views were cited with approval
and adopted in Hunter v. Royal Canadian Insurance Co., 3 Hughes 234. In
Whitehouse v. Continental Fre Insurance
Co., 2 Fed. Rep. 498, the point was
taken in argument that the true construction of the act, required the petition to
at or before the first term, when
be filed
the case could be put at issue, but the
court, BUTLER, J., rejected this contention, and held that the case could be removed at any time before the pleadings
are complete, or at the first term following their completion. To the same effect
are Blackwell v. Braun, I Fed. Rep.
351, and Forest v. Forest Home, Id. 459.
In Murrayv. Holden, 2 Fed. Rep. 740,
McCstiuY, J., takes an opposite view
and holds that the petition must be filed
at or before the first term, when the case
might "have been trie, if the pleadings
had been made up with the utmost diligence, and entirely irrespective of the
qutstion whether they actually were settled
or not. He says, "One of the objects of
the Act of 1875, was to prevent the
abuses which had been practised under
the Acts of 1866 and 1867, which al-

lowed a removal at anytime.before final
hearing. It was evidently the purpose
of Congress to fix an earlier and a definite time, which would not permit the
litigant to experiment in the state court,
until satisfied that he would fail there,
and then change his forum. In all the
states there is by law or rule a trial
term, i.e., a term at which a cause may
for the first time be called for trial. It
practice but few contested cases are tried
at the first trial term, and it often happens that controversies arise upon questions of pleading, so that as in this case,
no issues of fact are joined at that time.
It is, nevertheless, the term at which,
within the meaning of the law, such
cases could be tried, and, therefore, is
the term at or before which the petition
for removal must be filed. The statute
does not contemplate any delay for the
purpose of settling the pleadings in the
state court. These can be settled in the
federal court, after removal, if necessary. If the local law makes thu first
term after suit brought an appearance
term merely, and declares that the second
term is the one at which the case may be
brought to trial, then the latter is the
term at or before which the petition for
removal must be filed. But where the
first term after service of process, is the
term at which, by law, a case is triable,
then that is the term to which the Act
of Congress refers. In other words, the
term at which a case can first be tried, is
the first term at which it may by law be
tried. The statute should be construed
so as to require litigants who have a
choice of forums to make their election
promptly."
It is not likely that the doctrine
last cited case will be generally
of this
accepted. Its reasoning seems to be
based upon the system of practice in
force under the codes which have been
adopted in the states comprising the circult where the decision was made.
Craigie v. McArthur, 4 Dill. 474, decides what seems self evident that the
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case must be removed while in the court
of original jurisdiction.
The provisions of the Act of 1875,
relating to the removal of cases begun in
state courts before its passage, were
considered in Missouri v. Merritt, 1
Fed. Rep. 283, where it was held that
the right of removal was lost, if the case
was tried in the state court after the passage of the act, although the term in
which it was tried, began before the passage. But if no trial has actually taken
place, an application for removal of such
case was in time if made at the first term
of court after the passage of the act:
Removal Cases, 10 Otto 457. Where a
case was tried in the state court oft April
14th 1875, and the jury disagreeing,
was continued at that term and the term
following, an application for removal,
afterwards made, came too late: Bible
Society v. Grive, 11 Otto 610. Where
one trial has been had in the state court,
the right to another must be perfected
before a demand can be made for the
removal of the case to the Circuit Court:
Railroad Co. v. McKinley, 9 Otto 147.
V. Effect of failure to file transcript
of record in federal court. In several
cases the question has arisen as to the
consequences resulting from the failure
of the removing party to file a transcript
of the record at the next term of the
Circuit Court. It may now be regarded
as settled, that the only legal effect of
the failure so to file, is to work a forfeiture of the bond, but it does not
destroy the jurisdiction of the court. In
Jackson v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 3
Woods 413, it is said, "This seems
entirely inconsistent with the idea, that
unless the copy of the record is filed on
the first day of the next succeeding term
of the federal court, that court is without jurisdiction of the cause. The filing
of the record on the precise day prescribed, cannot, therefore, be a matter
of jurisdiction ; but the failure to file is
one of the damages to be recovered on
the bond given for the removal, and

although the Circuit Court may wet
remand for failure of the party seeking
the removal to comply with his bond,
yet if the delay has caused no prejudice
and the party wishes the case to go on
in the Circuit Court, and complies with
all the requisites for removal at a day
subsequent, it is in the discretion of the
court to grant him indulgence." To
the same effect is Kidder v. Featteau, 2
Fed. Rep. 616. The doctrine of these
cases is confirmed by the remarks of
WAITE, C. J., in Removal Cases, supra,
"While the Act of Congress requires
security that the transcript shall be filed
on the first day, it nowhere appears that
the Circuit Court is to be deprived of its
jurisdiction, if, by accident, the party is
delayed until a later day in the term.
If the Circuit Court, for good cause
shown, accepts the transfer after the day
and during the term, its jurisdiction will,
as a general rule, be complete, and the
removal properly effected." A different
construction seems to have been given
to the act in the second circuit. In
McLean v. St. Paul Railroad Co., 16
Blatch. 309, it was held, that except in
the instance specified in sect. 7, of the
Act of March 3d 1875, the failure to
file a copy of the record by the time
appointed in the bond, will necessitate
a remanding of the case. The samo
view of the law was taken in Bright v.
Milwaukee Railroad Co., 14 Blatch. 214.
V. Of the effect of the Act of 1875
on prior acts. The Act of 1875 repealed
all prior legislation so far as it covered
any case which might be removed under
the act of 1875, but in so far as prior
acts contained provisions which permitted removals under circumstances not
covered by the Act of 1875, these acts
remained in full force: LaMothe Manufacturing Co. v. National Tube IVoik
Co., 15 Blatch. 432, and Dennis v.
Alachua, 3 Woods 683. So, that where
a party is able to make the affidavit
required by the Act of 1867, that owing
to local influence or prejudice he will be

STONE v. SARGENT.
unable to secure a fair trial in the state
court, he is entitled to a removal as
provided for in that act: Whitehouse v.
Continental Insurance Co., 2 Fed. Rep.
498. But this right is only given where
the adverse party is a citizen of the
state in which the suit was brought:
Bile Society v. Grove, 11 Otto 610. So,
also, where a party, not entitled to a
removal under the Act of 1875, can
bring himself within the Act of July
27th 1866, he is entitled to a removal:
Mormser v. Dahlman, 16 Blatch. 319.
In YTdee v. Fose, 9 Otto 539, the right
of removal under this act was strikingly
illustrated. A suit was brought in a
New York state court by a citizen
of New York, against five defendants
who were citizens of New York, and
a sixth defendant, a citizen of Florida.
The proceedings in the court below
resulted in a decree for the defendants,
the case was taken to the Court of
Appeals, and the decree affirmed as
to the five defendants, and reversed
as to the sixth, one Yule, a citizen
of Florida; the record having been
sent back for further proceedings, Yulee
fileda petition for a removal, and
the right of removal being denied in the
state court, an appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court of the United States,
who held, that he was entitled to the
removal asked for, WAiTE, C. J., saying, "The evident purpose of the Act
of 1866, was to relieve a person sued
with others in the courts of a state of
which he was not w citizen, by one who
was a citizen, from the disabilities of his
co-defendants in respect to the removal
of the litigation to the courts of the
United States, if he could separate the
controversy so fa as it concerned him
from the others, without prejudice to his
adversary. In view of the fact, that
sometimes in the progress of a cause, circumstances developed themselves which
made such a transfer desirable when at
first it did not appear to be so, the right
of removal in this class of cases was
VOL. XX.-6
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kept open until the trial or final hearing,
instead of being closed after an entry
of appearance, as was the rule under the
Act of 1789. -We think this gives such
a party the right of removal at any time
before the trial, when the necessary
citizenship of his co-defendants is found
to exist, and the separation of his interest
in the controversy can be made. There
is nothing in the act to manifest a contrary intention, and this construction
does no more than give the party to
whom this new privilege is granted an
opportunity of availing himself of any
circumstances that may appear in his
favor previous to the time when he is
called upon finally to act."
VII. Character of proceedings which
may be removed. The character of
proceedings themselves is always open
to examination for the purpose of determining whether ratione materitm the
courts of the United States are incompetent to take jurisdiction thereof.
Under this principle, in Barrow v.
Hunton, 9 Otto 80, it was held that
a proceeding to nullify a judgment for
mere vices in the form of proceeding
could not be removed, BntADLEY, J.,
saying, "The question presented with
regard to the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court is, whether the proceedings to procure nullity of the former judgment in
such a case as the present is or is not in
its nature a separate suit, or whether it
is a supplementary proceeding so connected with the original suit as to form
an incident to it, and substantially a
continuation of it. If the proceeding is
merely tantamount to the common-law
practice of moving to set aside a judgment for irregularity, or to a writ of
error, or to a bill of review or an
appeal, it woull belong to the latter
category, and the United States court
could not properly entertain jurisdiction
of the case. Otherwise, the Circuit
Courts of the United States would
become invested with power to control
the proceedings in the state courts, or
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would have appellate jurisdiction over
them in all cases where the parties are
citizens of different states. Such a
result would be totally inadmissible.
On the other hand, if the proceedings
are tantamount to a bill in equity, to
set aside a decree of fraud in the obtaining thereof, then they constitute an
original and independent proceeding,
and according to the doctrine laid down
in Gaines v. Fuentes, 2 Otto 10, the case
might be within the cognisance of the
federal courts. The distinction between
the two classes of cases may he somewhat nice, but it may be affirmed to
exist. In the one class there would he a
mere revision of errors and irregularities, or of the legality and correctness
of the judgments and decrees of the
state courts ; and in the other class, the
investigation of a new case arising upon
new facts, although having relation to
the validity of an actual judgment or
decree, or of the party's right to claim
any benefit by reason thereof." To the
same effect is Chapman v. Barger, 4
Dillon 557, where it was held that a
mere dependence upon a main suit
which has been determined cannot he
removed. On the other hand, whenever
the proceedings have an independent
character, the federal court has jurisdiction. Under this principle, in Southworth v. Adams, 4 Fed. Rep. 1, a proceeding to establish a lost will was
removed to the federal court, and in
Craigie v. McArthur, 4 Dillon 557,
jurisdiction was accepted of a proceeding to distribute the estate of a deceased
person.
VIII. Cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Exactly what cases are removable under
tis clause is by no means easy to determine. Houser v. Clayton, 3 Woods 273,
was an action of trespass, in which the
defendant justified the alleged trespass
upon the ground that he was acting under the authority of a federal court, and
in pursuance of the laws of the United

States. It was held that the can was
removable, BiADIzy, J., saying " Such
a defence set up in a suit in the state
court and overruled there, would clearly
entitle the defendants to carry the case
by writ of error to the Supreme Court
of the United States, both under -the
25th section of the old Judiciary Act
and under the Act of 1867, passed in
lieu thereof. But the only ground on
which it could be made thus reviewable
by that court, is that it is a case arising
under the constitution or laws of the
United States, and, if it is such a case,
then it is removable to the Circuit Court
of the United States under the second
section of the Act of 1875." In Louisiana Lottery v. Iltpatrick, 3 Woods 222,
upon the same question, it was said,
"Prior to this statute the jurisdiction
of this court depended, in a great
measre, upon the "ondition or character of the parties, and upon particular
laws of the United States. This statute vests a jurisdiction of all cases
which may involve the enforcement of
the constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States in their determination."
A suit involving the construction of the
bankrupt act is a suit involving the construction of the laws and constitution of
the United States, and is removable:
Connor v. Scott, 4 Dillon 247. But the
fact that the subject of controversy is
the title to real estate made under a sale
by a United States marshal, is not
enough to give jurisdiction to the federal court. Such a case is not one
arising under the constitution or laws
of the United States: Gay v. Lyons, 3
Woods 56. In Van Allen v. Atchison,
6-c., Railroad Co., 3 Fed. Rep. 545,
the construction of the phrase, cases
arising under the constitution and laws
of the United States, which had been
adopted by the Supreme Court m
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, was
followed.
But this clause of the act has uast
received an interpretation from a ma-
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jority of the Supreme Court (bfriuae,

J., dissenting, and CLiPFoRD, F

EzL

and HUNT, JJ., absent), which will
tend to settle the law upon this subject
so far as it concerns the general principles governing the right of removal
under this clause, leaving to future cases
the determination of the manner in which
this right of removal shall be exercised.
The case referred to is New Orleans
Ralrat Co. v. Mis~sippi (U. S. S. C.,
Oct. Sess., 1880, not yet reported). It
was a proceeding instituted on behalf of
the state of Mississippi against the railroad
company to obtain a mandamus to compel -the defendant to remove a bridge with
which they had obstructed a navigable
river. The defendant filed a petition for
removal upon the ground that the case
involved a question arising under the constitution and laws of the United States,
because an Act of Congress had given
them the right to construct this bridge.
The case coming before the Supreme
Court of the United States upon a writ
of error to the highest court of the state,
the judgment of the state court, who had
refused to recognise the right of removal,
was reversed, and Mr. justice HAsL&I,
delivering the opinion of the court,
said, "A case in law or equity consists
of the right of one party as well as of
the other, and may properly be said to
arise under the constitution or a law of
the United States, whenever its correct
decision depends on the construction of
either. Cases arising under the laws
of the United States are such as grow
out of the legislation of Congress,
whether they constitute the right or
privilege or claim or protection or defence of the party, in whole or in part,
by whom they are asserted." The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice MiLLnn
is worthy of attention ; after defining
the word "suits," which is the word
used in the Act of March 3d 1875, and
the
distinguishing it from "cases,"
word used in the constitution, he says,
"Taking the idea of a 'suit,' as thus

defined, what is meant by the suit arising
under a law of Congress ? The obvious
answer seems to be that the cause of
action is founded on the Act of Con
gress; that the remedy sought is one
given by an Act of Congress; that the
relief which is prayed is a relief dependent on an Act of Congress; that the
right to be enforced in the suit is a right
which rests upon an Act of Congress.
In all this I see no place for holding that
a defence to a suit not so founded on an
Act of Congress or a plea which the
defendant may interpose to any ordinary
action, though that plea be founded on
an Act of Congress, is a suit arising
under an Act of Congress. Looking
also to the reasons which may have
influenced Congress, it may well be supposed that while it intended to allow the
removal of a suit into the courts of the
United States where the very foundation
and support of it was a law of the United
States, it did not "ntend to authorize a
removal, where the cause of action depended solely on the law of the state,
and when the Act of Congress only came
in question incidentally as part (it may
be a very small part) of the defendant's
plea in avoidance. In support of this
view, it may be added that a defendant
in such case is not without remedy in a
federal court, for if he has pleaded and
relied on such defence in the state court,
and that court has decided against him
in regard to it, he can remove the case
into this court by writ of error, and have
the question he has thus raised decided
here, by the highest court of the United
States." The opinion of the majority
of the court in this case is also important
on another point; they say, "It is not
sufficient to exclude the judicial power
of the United States from a particular
case that it involves questions which do
not at all depend on the constitution or
laws of the United States, but when a
question to which the judicial power of
the Union is extended by the constitu
tion forms an ingredient of the original

HYNES v. McDERMOTT.
cause, it is within the power of Congress
to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of
that cause, although other questions of
fact or of law may be involved in it."
When an indictment for muraer is
removed to the federal court for trial
under this act, the accused is called upon
to answer the offence as defined by the
laws of the state where it was committed: Georgia v. O'Grady, 3 Woods
496. The right of removal in cases
arising under this branch of the law is
also elaborately discussed by the Supreme
Court in Tennessee v. Davis, 10 Otto
258, and Strauder v. West Virginia, 10
Id. 303.
In conclusion, we may notice the case
of the People's Bank v. Winslow (U. S.
S.C., Oct. Term 1880, not yet reported),
where the court reiterated the well-established principle that the consent of the
parties cannot give jurisdiction in a case

where the requisite --itizenship or subject
matter does not exist ; but in that partioular case, which was a suit instituted ii
a state court, but directly affectiLg the
receiver of a railroad appointed by the
federal court, the right of removal was
sustained, Mr. Justice MILLER, saying.
"The jurisdiction of the United States
court does not here depen, -n the
citizenship of the parties, but oz the
subject-matter of the litigation. That
was in the actual possession of that court
when the state court attempted to levy
its writ of attachment on the property.
It was for the court having such possession.to determine how far it would permit any other court to interfere with that
possession, and what effect it would give
to the attempt of another court to seize
the property so under its control."
RzcmtARx
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By the law of New York marriage is a civil contract, and may be created by an
agreement per rerba de presenti, without any required form or ceremony.
Evidence of cohabitation, acknowledgment and reputation, will be sufficient to
enable a court to presume an actual marriage in the beginning.
Whether acts sufficient to constitute a marriage by the laws of New York, done
in a foreign state, by the laws of which they would not be sufficient, will be held to
constitute a valid marriage in New York, not decided.
But in the absence of evidence of the law of the foreign state, the courts of New
York will not presume it to be different from the law of New York.
Whether a vessel on the high seas carries with it the marriage law of its nationality, not decided.
An expert in handwriting when testifying only from a comparison of hands,
should have before him in court both the writings as to which he speaks and those
from which he speaks.
Photographic copies of originals not produced in evidence before the jury are not
admissible as foundation for a comparison of hands, especially in the absence of
proof of the details of the process by which they were taken, and the accuracy of the
Nork.
Testimony as to handwriting is testimony of opinion. Any person acquainted
with it may give his opinion, and the acquaintance need not be from seeing the per-
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son write; it is sufficient if the writing was seen under such circumstances as to preclude doubt that it was genuine.
A witness will not be permitted to testify upon a question of handwriting if the
standards upon which he has formed his opinion have been selected by, or in the
interest of the party calling him.
Books professing to contain the laws of a foreign country, but not published by
the government thereof or under its express sanction, cannot be received as evidence
of the law of such foreign country, even though supported by the opinion of an expert, founded on reason and the reputation of the writer, that they do contain such
laws.
Presumptions as to continuance of state of facts proved to have existed at a time
anterior to that in question (as e. g. the statute law of a foreign state) discussed.
ERROR to Common Pleas of the county of New York. The
action was ejectment by respondents, who claimed to be the widow
and children of W. R. Hynes. The opinion of the court below
will be found in 19 American Law Register, N. S., 219.

J. H. Drake, for appellants.

J. H. -hoate and WF. I. Secor (with whom was Tugh Weightman, an English barrister, consulted as special expert on the law
of marriage).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FOLGER, C. J.-Whether plaintiffs below axe the widow and
children respectively, of William R. Hynes, depends upon the
validity as a marriage contract of what took place in his lifetime
between the intestate and the plaintiff, who now claims to be his
widow, and at times before the birth of the other plaintiffs. Enough
took place at those times, if it had been done in the territory of
this state, to have made a valid contract of marriage. Enough
took place afterward to furnish a presumption, under the laws of
this state, of a prior legally formed and subsisting marriage relation.
By the law of this state a man and a woman who are competent to
marry each other, without going before a minister or magistrate,
without the presence of any person as a witness, with no previous
public notice given, with no form or ceremony, civil or religious,
and with no record or written evidence of the act kept, and merely
by words of present contract between them, may take upon themselves the relation of husband and wife, and be bound to themselves,
to the state and to society as such; and if after that the marriage
is denied, proof of actual cohabitation as husband and wife,
acknowledgment and recognition of each other to friends and
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acquaintances and the public as such, and the general reputation
thereof, will enable a court to presume that there was in the beginning an actual and bonafide marriage: Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50
N. Y. 184, and cases there cited.
But what passed between the intestate and the adult plaintiff
took place out of the territory of thi3 state. Part of it took place
upon English soil, and it is conceded that it did not make a lawful
marriage according to the laws of England. Part of it took place
upon the sea, in a vessel coming from an English port and crossing
the channel to a French port. Part of it took place in France.
In some state of the case here might come in the question,
whether, if the acts which would make a valid marriage when done
in this state are done outside its bounds, and not in accordance with
the law of the place where done, they will make a relation which
will be upheld as a valid marriage by the laws of this state.
But this question we need not decide. There is no proof of what
is the law of marriage in France, and we will not presume that it
is different from that of this state: Monroe v. Douglas, 5 N. Y.
447; Savage v. O'Neil, 44 Id. 298. There is no proof of the
nationality of the vessel in which the parties crossed the channel,
and we will not presume that it was that of a country whose law
of marriage has been proved in this case to be different from that
of this state, even if we are required to hold that a vessel on the
seas has with it the law of marriage of the nation whose flag it
flies. There was enough in the testimony of what took place
between the parties at sea, and between them, their friends,
acquaintances and the public, while they were in France, to sustain
the verdict of the jury, that they were husband and wife in accordance with the law of this state: United States Trust Co., Receiver,
v. Barris, 2 Bosw. 75.
Though they cohabited in England before crossing the channel,
the testimony, while it does not prove a marriage in accord with
English law, shows enough for a jury to find therefrom that there
was the purpose and form of marriage, that there was a refusal on
the part of the woman to commence a meretricious cohabitation,
and a yielding on the part of the intestate to her demand for marriage before cohabitation should be had.
A marriage having been thus found on proof enough to sustain
the verdict, the legitimacy of the minor plaintiffs, as the sons of
the intestate, is beyond dispute in the case at this time. The
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judgment for the plaintiffs is to be sustained, unless error is shown
by some of the other points made by the defendants. * * * [Here
the opinion proceeded to dispose of some minor exceptions, not of
general interest.]
The court did not allow the witness, Loader, to testify, that the
handwriting of the signature to the lease of the premises in Leverton
street was that of the adult plaintiff. The witness had never seen
her write; he had no knowledge of her handwriting, save that got
by looking upon two writings other than the signature to the lease,
which other writings she had acknowledged in his presence, and
with the writings then before them, to have been penned by her.
Those other writings were two signatures of names of persons, and
one written name of a place of residence, as shown by a signature
book kept by a bank at which she had opened two accounts of
money deposited by her. These writings were not in evidence in
the case-that is, they were not produced before the jury, and
kept in court throughout the trial. The witness who controlled
them was examined beyond the seas on commission. He produced
them before the commissioner, but refused to part with them.
Copies were taken in manuscript by the commissioner and annexed
to the deposition of the witness. The witness, Loader, was presented to the court as doubly competent to speak on an issue as to
the genuineness of handwriting as an expert, and as having personal knowledge of the handwriting of the adult plaintiff.
It does not appear from the case that the trial court determined
whether he was qualified to speak as an expert. We will assume
that he was, and that had the trial court thought it needful to pass
upon the question, it would have held that he was; yet, in our
judgment, it was not proper to receive his testimony as that of an
expert, and by a comparison of handwritings. An expert in handwriting, when speaking as a witness, only from a comparison of
handwriting-that is, with two pieces of it in juxtaposition under
his eye-should have before him in court the writing to which he
testifies and the writings from which he testifies, else there can be
no intelligent examination of him, either in chief or cross, nor can
there be fair means of meeting his testimony by that of other
witnesses. This requirement is included in the rule that there can
be no comparison of handwriting, unless the pieces of writing by
which comparison is made are properly in evidence in the case for
some purpose other than that of being compared: Bandolph v
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Loughlin, 48 N. Y. 456; Dubois v. Baker, 30 Id. 355; Mile#
v. Loomis, 75 Id. 288. The nearest approach to having before the
witness at the trial, writings by which comparison had been or wa#
to be made, was the bringing of the photographic copies. There
was no proof of the details of the process by which they were
taken, nor as to accuracy of the work. We think that a comparison
of a signature in dispute with such photographic copies of other
writings, for the purpose of allowing an opinion from an expert as
to the character of the signature as real or feigned, when the
originals from which the copies are made are not brought before
the jury, and may not be shown to other witnesses, ought not to be
permitted. Photographs that have been taken of persons found
d ad have been admitted in evidence in this state in aid of other
Froofs of identity, but not alone. They were characterized as
slight evidence in addition to other and more reliable testimony:
Iluloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213. A photographic picture was
more unreservedly admitted as evidence upon the question of
identity of person in Udderzook v. Commonwealth, 76 Penn. St.
840, and in another case, when the genuine signature and the
disputed signature were both brought into court, magnified photographic copies of each, together with the originals, were submitted
to the inspection of the jury, and it was held not to have been error:
Marcy v. Barnes, 16 Gray 162. But copies of letters in a letter book, produced by impress or by a machine, have'been rejected:
Commonwealth v. .Eadtman,1 Cush. 189. It would be carrying
the matter much farther to permit an expert to compare photographic copies of signatures, and therefrom to testify as to the
genuineness of a disputed signature. We may recognise that the
photographic process is ruled by general laws that are uniform in
their operation, and that, almost without exception, a likeness is
brought forth of the object set before the camera. Still, somewhat
for exact likeness will depend upon the adjustment of the machinery,
upon the atmospheric conditions and the skill of the manipulator,
and in so delicate a matter as the reaching of judicial results by
the comparison of writings through the testimony of experts, it
ought to be required that the witness should exercise his acumen
up n the thing itself which is to be the basis of his judgment; and
still more, that the thing itself should be at hand, to be put under
the eye of other witnesses for the trial upon it of their skill. The
certainty of expert testimony in these cases is not so well assured
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as that we can afford to let in the hazard of error or differences in
copying, though it be done by howsoever a scientific process;
besides, as before said, tlere was no proof here of the manner and
exactness of the photographic method used. It was right not to
receive Loader's evidence as that of an expert.
The witness was also offered as one having acquaintance with
the handwriting of the adult plaintiff. All his means of knowledge have been stated. The testimony was finally rejected after
the objection made to it that it was a collateral fact whether the
lease was signed by the plaintiff, and that the defendants had proved
by her that she had not signed it. The objection is not well put
in claiming that the defendants proved by the plaintiff that she
did not sign the lease. At one time she said she did not recognise
the signature to it as hers, but she would not say it was not hers,
while she would not admit that it was. At another time she was
explicit in denial; but her testimony on this head was not conclusive. Neither can we assent that the fact sought to be proved was
a collateral fact in a sense that precluded the defendants from
offering any other testimony upon it than that of the plaintiff herself. She was the witness of the defendants, to be sure, and they
could not impeach her. But if she was mistaken in her testimony,
or forgetful, so that she could not speak as to a matter, the defendants were not shut out from proving the fact, if material, by other
witnesses. It was material, if this plaintiff, during the time that,
as she now claims, she was the wife of Hynes and entitled and
bound to bear his name, was entering into written contracts in
another name, which was that of the wife or widow still unmarried of another man. The testimony offered tended to prove that;
we think, therefore, that that objection was not good. The prior
objection was, in effect, that Loader had not shown that he was
acquainted with the signature of the plaintiff. Testimony as to
handwriting is testimony of opinion. Any person acquainted
with it may be permitted to give his opinion of it. The acquaintance need not come from having seen the person write. It may
be formed from seeing writing under such circumstances as put it
beyond doubt that it was a true signature. In this case the witness Loader had seen writing admitted by the plaintiff to be hers;
thus he had seen her genuine handwriting. If the case was not
so confined as that the correctness of the holding at the Circuit
would hang upon whether the view of one piece of genuine handVOL. XXIX.-

50

HYNES v. IcDERMOTT.

writing would qualify one to speak as a witness as to the gen-uineness
of another and a disputed signature, we find authority to show that
a holding rejecting the testimony would be incorrect: Hammond
v. Varian, 54 N. Y. 398; Garrells v. Alexander, 4 Esp. Cas. 37.
The competency of a witness is not determined by the degree of
his knowledge. If he has had meats of becnoming acquainted
with the handwriting in question, he is competent to speak, and
the weight of his testimony is for the jury. The objection, however, was broader than that, and covered all the circumstances in
which Loader had been placed with regard to this handwriting.
It appeared that he was, by calling, a private detective, and had
gone to England as such in the employ of the defendants after the
commencement of this action; that it was while in the pursuit of
evidence against the plaintiffs that he learned of this bank-book
writing, and while engaged in taking the evidence, in behalf of
the defendants, of a witness, on commission, that he saw the writing, and heard the admission of the plaintiff that it was made by
her. His acquaintance with her handwriting was from an examination of these two pieces of it, and it was formed while he was a
hired agent in quest of testimony with which to combat the plaintiff's case, and of testimony to be made from the handwriting of
the adult plaintiff. It is not to be distinguished from a case of
genuine writings furnished to a person to enable him to become a
witness to a disputed signature. It is clear that if the genuine
writings had been made or chosen for his inspection by the party
who called him as a witness so as to qualify him to speak, his testimony to be based upon an acquaintance got from view of them
would not be received: Stranger v. Searle, 1 Esp. 14; Tome v.
ParkersburqRailroad Co., 39 Md. 36; and it has been held at
Nisi Prius that when the acquaintance is formed from the view of
writings admitted by the attorney of the writer to be genuine, the
witness will not be allowed (Greaves v. Runter, 2 C. & P. 477),
though on the other hand, when the genuine writing from which
the witness got his knowledge was to a paper filed in the cause by
the opposite party, the testimony was allowed: Smith v. Sain8bury, 5 0. & P. 196. These cases exemplify how lacking in
uniformity are the rulings on this -matter,and how delicate a question it is to handle. The last two cases are not directly in point,
inasmuch as it did not appear that the witness, when he saw the
genuine writings, was seeking the means of making acquaintance,
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so that he might testify therefrom. A difference between the case
in hand and those cited from Espinasse and the Maryland Reports,
is, that in the latter two the genuine signatures were made or
chosen by the parties who wished it to appear to the witness that
the disputed signature was unlike the genuine ones insrected by
him, while in the former the genuine signature is used in the case,
and is admitted to be genuine by the party against whom the witness is called. Still it is a case of signatures selected in the
interest of the party who calls the witness. They were pitched
upon by the witness himself, who, in the hire of the party, bad
been sent in quest of hostile evidence, and that after the commencement of the action. All the stimulus upon, and all the
impulses of his calling, were against impartiality in selection of
specimens. The distinction is taken in the Fitzwalter Peerage
Case, 10 C1. & Fin. 193, between the testimony of a witness, who,
intending to be a witness, has inspected genuine documents for the
purpose of forming an acquaintance with the characteristics of a
certain handwriting, and that of one, who, in the course of business, without having in view the being a witness, has used the
same documents and thus got an acquaintance. In our judgment
the evidence is open to the objections that have been held fatal to
testimony as to handwriting created post litem motam. We think
that, upon all that transpired on the trial in the testimony of
Loader and the objections made, the trial court did not err in
ruling out the question. The legislature of this state has this year
(Laws of 1880, c. 86), passed an act which is intended to allow
proof of signature by comparison of handwritings, and which,
perhaps, will forestall for the future much discussion of this topic.
That statute, however, is probably yet to be the subject of judicial
interpretation.
The next point is that of the rejection of the offer to read from
the books claimed to contain the law of France. It is well enough
to consider -it, though the result we reach is not so determinate as
may be wished for. There were shown to the witness two volumes
of a printed work, and a single volume of another work. He said
that the two were the French Code, and that the three were all
the French acts, the five Codes and State laws of France. The
very books thus shown to him he saw then for the first time. He
had been a practising lawyer in France from 1887 until 1862, and
left that country in 1863. The date of the edition of the two
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volumes was 1859. The date of the last edition was 187T. He
said that they constituted a printed copy of the Code of Statutes
of France, as they existed when he practised there; that he had
occassion to use, and did use, the printed statutes of France every
day in the courts of that country, and that he had not the slightest
doubt that the two volumes produced constituted a printed copy of
the statutes or book which was commonly received by the judicial
tribunals of France as evidence of the existing laws thereof; that
he had no doubt it was an exact copy of the French law; that it
was the same thing, the only difference being in the notes of the
author, M. Rogron. He would not say that that opinion was based
upon an examination of the books, and did say that it was founded
on reason. He first saw the volume in court on the day that he was
examined, and had not looked into the books save at the title page;
but he said that that very copy he would use before a French tribunal the first time he had an occasion to quote the French law, and
that the work of M. Rogron would be received therein as proof of
the existing law. We have here given all of the testimony of the
witness. It will be seen that the books he had before him were the
publication of a private person. They were not proven to have
been published by the authority of France, nor does it appear that
they purported so to have been. It was testified, however, that they
were at the time spoken to by the witness received in the tribunals
thereof as a proof of the then existing law. The old and the new
Code provide in nearly the same terms for a mode of proving the
statute law of a foreign country: old Code, sect. 426, new Code,
sect. 942. The new Code also (sect. 962) permits the proof of an
act according to the rules of the common law or by any other competent proof. We think that the testimony of this witness would
not bring the offer to read the books within the rule of the common law. As to what that is held to be in England, see Baron de
Bode's Oase, 8 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 208, 250, et seq.; -Earl.lVon v.
Lord Bridport, 8 Beavan 527; Sussex Peerage Case, 11 Cl. &
Fin. 85, 111. To prove the. written law of a foreign state by a
printed book purporting to cq'tain it, though the book is sustained
by the testimony of a witness familiar with the law, was not permitted, so far as we can find, in this state before the Codes: Packard v. Hill, 2 Wend. '411; see s. c., Hill v. Packard, 5 Id.
375. And again, it was held that to prove the statute law of a
foreign state, there must be produced a copy authenticated there,
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or a sworn copy: Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend. 482, and such
proof as was produced in our case, according to that decision,
would not have been deemed equivalent to a sworn copy: Id., pp.
483-4; UTkanoine v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173. Even if that testimony
would meet the requirement of the new Code (sect. 942), for the
time of which the witness spoke, from 1837, when he was first
licensed to practice, until 1862, when he ceased to practice, a
question arises. The period for the existing law of which the trial
court was seeking was from a late day in June 1871, until the
expiration of four weeks thereafter. It is claimed, however, that
the law of France having been shown as it existed in 1862, we are
.to presume that it continued the same until the year 1871. Presumptions of the continued existence of the same state of things
arise when the things are continuous in their own nature. They
are founded on the experienced continuance, immutability for a
longer or shorter period, of human affairs. What may be presumed
of one country and one state of society, may not so readily be
presumed of another. Thus, at one time in England, it was held
that it will not be intended that a man alters his trade or profession, but by presumption he continues in it through life: Tuthil
v. Hilton, Yelv. 158. It has been held that a partnership, an
agency or a tenancy once shown to exist, is presumed to continue
until it is proved to have been dissolved; and so far has this been
carxied that where it was admitted that a partnership had been in
existence in 1816, it was, in the absence of all evidence to the
contrary, presumed to be still continuing in 1838: Olark v. Alexander, 8 Scott (N. R.) 161, which seems to us an extreme carriage
of the rule. Would it do in the United States to base judicial
action on that presumption in the breadth of it as stated in those
cases ? It has, indeed, been held, that the statute law of another
state of this Union having been proven, it must be presumed to
exist until shown by good evidence to have been repealed:
ayn-.
ham v. Canton, 3 Pick. 293. Statutes of our own state are read
to the courts, and they stand as the law until a repealing statute is
produced. This is, however, on the theory that the judges know
what is the statute law of their own state, and need to hear it only
to refresh their memory: Lincoln v. Battelle, supra, p. 483. It
may be that if the question was before us, whether in a case presenting it, that presumption should be made, we would feel obliged
to make it. But then, even, there would arise the query whether,
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by a true interpretation of the Code (sect. 942), it must not be held
to require that, as the existing law which may be proved is the
law existing at the very time of the transaction that is in controversy, the proof to be received must be addressed directly to that
time, and show by direct assertion that there was the book of
statute laws now produced admitted in the judicial tribunals of the
foreign country as evidence of its law.
It will not fail to be noticed that the witness had not read these
very books, nor a page of them, save the title page. It must have
struck the circuit judge, as it strikes, us, as difficult to conceive
how one could testify that the contents of these books, issued from
the press as a venture of private business, without the impress of
public or official authority, contained the law of France as it existed
at any given time, when he knew not from perusal what were the
contents of the books. It is to be noticed further of one of them
that it was issued in the year of 1877. It is impossible that this
book, or a book of the same edition, could have been used in
1862, and prior thereto, before the judicial tribunals of France, as
evidence to them of the existing law of that state; and, as the
witness had not looked into the contents of the books, would not
say that" he had made an examination of them, and did say that he
founded his opinion on reason, how could he satisfy the court that
those contents had ever been spread before a French tribunal as
evidence of the law ? The most of which the witness could satisfy
the court by the testimony lie gave was this: That the work of the
author, whom he named, was usually received in the courts of
France as containing its law. Whether these books were the work
of that author the witness had not informed himself by a perusal
of them. He knew no more of that than what the title page told
him, assisted by his reason. Verily this is weak testimony on
which to take printed books as evidence of foreign statute law,
from the contents of them to draw material for an adjudication.
Now though'it is said by a text writer of repute (Tayler on Evidence 48, pp. 62, 63, 7th ed.) that in regard to foreign laws the
functions of the judges and jury do not seem to be yet well distinguished, still it seems that it is the duty of the court to decide as
to the complete knowledge of the witness, and as to the admissibility of the documents by which, or as to which,, he speaks:
Bristow v. Sequeville, 5 Ex. Rep. 275; Sussex Peerage Case,
Rupra; -EarlNelson v. Lord Bridport, supra. That duty was ox
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the trial judge in our case, and we hesitate before we will say that
he was in judicial error in not deeming this witness well enough
informed of the contents of these books, or the books admissible as
proof of French law. It is not plain that there was error in the
ruling of the trial court. We are not compelled to pass definitely
upon these questions. If it be determined or conceded that the
marriage law of France, when the intestate and the adult plaintiff
cohabited there, was not observed by them in making their marriage contract there, still the jury have found, as a specific verdict,
that the parties did, while crossing the English Channel, enter into
art agreement to take each other then and there as man and wife.
As we have already said, so far as appears in this case, this was a
valid contract of marriage under the laws of this state, and the
general verdict of the jury is thus sustained: United States Trust
o., Reeeice', v. Harris, sup)r'a. We need not, therefore, pass
definitely upon the question raised by the offer of the defendants
to read in evidence the book claimed to be the law of France in
print.
We now come to the allegation of error in the charge. The
court charged the jury in substance, that though the transaction
between the parties in England was not a valid act or contract of
marriage by the laws of that country, yet that if iynes was a
citizen of this state, and did that act with the intention of marrying in accordance with the law of this state, and of bringing
the woman to this country to live with him as his wife, there was
the foundation of a valid marriage relation. The jury found, on
specific questions put to them, that the facts were in accordance
with the suppositions put in the charge. The defendants duly
excepted. This exception we do not deem it necessary to consider.
If the propositions stated in the charge be wrong, yet the jury
have by other specific findings established such facts in the case as
must uphold their general finding, that the adult plaintiff was the
[The rest of the opinion is upon matters
wife of Hynes.
not of general interest.]
In the foregoing ease the court has,

44 Id. 298."

And again: "It is con-

perhaps prudently, contented itself with

ceded,'' say the court, that" what passed

"There is no proof

between the intestate and the adult plain-

of what is the law of marriage in France,
and we will not presume that it is different from that of this state: .oM'oe v.
Douglass, 5 N. Y. 447; SacageY. O'Neil,

tiff took place out of the territory of this
state. Part of it took place on English
soil, and it is conceded that it did not
make a lawful marriage according to the

a negative decision.

56

HYINES

V.

M, cDERMOTT.

laws of England." This case therefore
cannot be said to have established a precedent, even in the state of New York, of
the lex domicilif, in the case of marriage,
prevailing over the lex ocd, where the
lex loci was proved.
"By the law of this state," the court
judicially remarks, "Iaman and a woman
who are competent to marry each other,
without going before a minister or magistrate, without the presence of any person as a witness, with no previous public
notice given, with no form or ceremony,
civil or religious, and with no record or
written evidence of the act kept, and
merely by words of present contract
between diem, may take upon themselves
the relation of husband and wife, and be
bound to themselves, to the state and
to society as such; and if, after that,
marriage is denied, proof of actual cohabitation as husband and wife, acknowledgment and recognition of each other
to friends and acquaintances and the
public as such, and the general reputation thereof, will enable a court to presume that there was in the beginning an
actual and bona fide marriage: Brnfej
v. Brindey, 50 N. Y. 184, and cases
there cited."
It will be observed that the court is
very guarded, and careful not to commit itself to any proposition of an international character, but simply confines itself to negatively declining to
presume the marriage law of France to
be different from that of the state of
New York, in the absence of evidence.
So with regard to the nationality of the
vessel on board of which the marriage
relations were said to be renewed. The
court wilt not presume, in the absence
of proof, that the nationality of such vessel "was that of a country whose law of
marriage has been proved in this case to
be different from that of this state."
"'CAndthiis," adds the court, "even if
we are required to hold that a vessel on
the seas has with it the law of marriage
of the nation whose flag it flies."

It will thus be seen that the opinion
carefully and judiciously avoids the con.
tention, which, "in some state of the
case might come in," viz.: whether
what took place out of the territory of
New York state, "not being in accordancq with the law of the place where
done, will make a relation which will be
upheld as a valid marriage by the laws
Without speculating
of this state."
upon that proposition, or upon the questiori of how far the laws of any particular country on the subject of marriage
can be imported into a vessel flying that
nation's flag on the high seas, it must be
borne in mind that the marriage law of
the state of New York is the ancient
common law of all christendom in all
its original simplicity, equally the law
of Holland as of England, of France as
of Germany, of the Roman Catholic
as of the Protestant churches, as it
prevailed before the enactment of the
decrees of the Council of Trent on the
one hand, or the English or any other
local marriage statutes on the other,;
and that, therefore, the presumption in
favor of the existence of the ancient
universal common law, where not positively proved to be abrogated in any
country where once it prevailed, especially in countries where the decrees of
the Council of Trent have never been
received, as in the case of Catholic
France, or of Protestant England, is a
logical sequence fully justifying the able
opinion expressed in"this case. Whether
on land or at sea the ancient matrimonial law of all christendom must be
presumed to exist, unless proof be adduced to force a concession to -the contrary. But the case before us does not go
to the extent of'saying that the lex domidlii must prevail over the lex lod, for
the fex domicilii in any country may be
statute local law, whether ecclesiastical
or civil, and, on the other hand, the lex
loci may be the ancient primitive common law of christendom. For instance,
an Englishman, domiciled in England,
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might be married in New York, merely
by words of present contract, in the
simple and unattested form so lucidly
expressed (perhaps not without a vein
of quiet sarcasm. upon such primitive
simplicity), in the opinion in this case;
*butyet the marriage would be in accordance with the la foci of New York, and
not in accordance with the lx doniciljj
of the Englihunan in question. Nevertheless, the marriage would be valid.
So. the lez loci of any particular state
in the Union might be far removed from
the simplicity of the common law, and
in such case the presumption that the
law of any foreign country coincided
with such local artificial statutable law,
would be somewhat too violent a conclusion to give validity to a marriage contracted by even a native-born domiciled
citizen of such state in a forcign country,
no proof being adduced of the requirements of the matrimonial law in such
foreign country ; but yet sufficient proof
,eing supplied that the requirements of
.ae lex domici ii alone were complied
with. It is the fact of New York state
having retained the matrimonial common
law, which once prevailed throughout
christendom, that justifies the presumption that such is still in existence elsewhere, unless specific proof is adduced
to the contrary. The question is simply
of legal presumption, and any modern
legislation tending to alter or impair the
basis upon which that presumption rests,
at once destroys the very superstructure
thus built upon it. The English courts
have gone perhaps as far as possible in
giving effect to the fWz dornicilii without
creating confusion or disregarding the
comity of nations. They have recently
adjudged that the law of the domicile
of the parties must decide the incidents,
but the validity of the marriage itself
must be judged of by the law of the country where celebrated. In other words,
that the ceremonial of the lex loci must
-ae complied with as a test of validity:
Briggs v. Briggs, Law Rep., 5 'robate
Vol,, XXLI-8

& Divorce 163; Harvey v. Farnie, Id
153.
In almost every case where a country
has superadded to the simplicity of the
common law of marriage and created a
new lex damicilii it would be impossible
to comply, in a foreign country, with
the home requirements for want s.f the
prescribed machinery; for instance, a
domiciled Englshman could not be married in New York state according to the
law of his domicile, for that law prescribes a clergyman of the Church of
England officiating in an English church
of the establishment, after banns or
license, except in the case of special
license, granted by the Archbishop of
Canterbuky alone, dispensing with all
other requirements than the presence of
the clergyman. How then could this
condition of the Englishman's law of
domicile be carried with him elsewhere ?
The only other mode of celebrating marriage in England is by a purely civil
ceremony in the presence of a registrix
or his representatives at his office, or
after certificate or license, as the case
may be, in .a building duly licensed for
the celebration. How then could that
process be effected in a foreign country ?
And yet this is the Englishman's law of
domicile. But let us hear what Sir C.
CRESSWELL, the former judge of the
English Matrimonial Court, says on this
subject of domicile, in Simonin v. Mallac,
2 Sw. & Tr. 67: "Every nation has a
right to impose on its own subjects restrictions and prohibitions as to entering
into marriage contracts, either within or
without its own territories; and if its
subjects sustain hardship in consequence
of those restrictions, their nations must
bear the blame; but what right has. one
independent nation to call upon another
nation equally independent to surrender
its own laws in order to give effect to
such restrictions and. prohibitions? If
there be any such law it must be found
in the law of nations, thatlaw ' to which
all nations have consented, or to which
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they must be presumed to consent, for
the common benefit and advantage.'
* * * * * Parties contracting in any
country are to be assumed to know, or
to take the responsibility of not knowing,
the law of that country. * * * * * *
Which law is to prevail ? to which country is an English tribunal to pay the
compliment of adopting its law ? As
far as the law of nations is concerned,
each must have an equal right to claim
respect for its laws. Both cannot be
observed ; would it not then be more just,
and therefore more for the interest of all,
that the law of that country should prevail which both are assumed to know
and to agree to be bound by? Again,
assume, that one of the parties is English, would not an English subject have
as strong a claim to the benefit of English
law as a foreigner to the benefit of foreign law? But it may be said that in
the case now before the court both parties
are French, and therefore no such difficulty could arise." (Or, we will superadd, bothparties might be agreeable that
the foreign law should prevail.) "That
is true," continues the learned judge,
"but if once the principle of surrendering
our own law to that of a foreign country
is recognised, it would be followed with
all its consequences ; the cases put are,
therefore, a fair test as to the possibility
of maintaining that by any comitas or
us gentium this court is bound to adopt
the law of France as its guide." "This
was the opinion,"I says Sir JAxEs H.&rwEN, president, in Sottomayor v. DeBarros; reported in Am. Law, Reg.,
February 1880, (N. S.) vol. 19, No. 2,
p. 84, "of Sir C."CREsawELL, Baron
CHANNELL- and Justice KEATING, con-

stituting the fall court which was at that
time in the position of the Court of
Appeal, and its decisions were only subject to review by the House of Lords."
In the same case (Sottomayor v. DeBarro;) Sir J. HAxNE proceeds: "What
have we to do, or, to be more correct,
what have the English tribunals to do

with what may be thought in other countries on such a subject ?"
It is true the learned judges in both
these cases were speaking of foreign
piohibitions on marriage, hut their remarks are equally applicable to the
converse state of things. "Reasons
may exist els6vhere," continues Sir J.
HANxun, "why colored- people and
white should not intermarry, or why first
cousins should not intermarry; but what
distinction can we properly draw between those cases? Why are they not
to be regarded in the same light here,
namely, that as they are legally permitted by our law, we cannot recognise
their prohibition by the laws of other
countries as a reason why we should
hold that such a marriage cannot be
contracted here." Apply this reasoning
to the conversd of the proposition, and
the logical sequence is adverse to the
adoption of the principle of the lex
domicilii.
In two cases before referred to, viz.,
Briggs v. Briggs, Law Rep., 5 Pro. &
Div. 163, and Harvey v. Farnie, Id. 1b3,
the domicile of the parties was allowed
to govern the cases in judging of the
validity or invalidity of a foreign divorce. Not that such is any new principle. The same principle was enunciated in Lolley's Case, Russ. & Ryl. C.
C. 237, A. D. 1812 ; but, however the
laws of domicile may operate in dealing
with subsequent incidents of marriage,
"the laws of each nation lay down the
form and solemnities, a compliance with
which shall be deemed the only criterion
of the intenti to enter into the contract." Per Loid BROUGMRLs, in Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Cl. & Fin. 488.
If it were otherwiser and two foreigners
from two different countries, each having
a different lez' domicili, assumed to enter
into a matrimonial contract in a third
country foreign to both of them, without
complying with the lex loci of that country, which of the three laws is to preAs has been before said, in
vail?

HY~'.McD CRMOTT.
-.
&scusing this same cas6 of
.lk',r,,tt,in the Ain. Law Re.,;'Apri
18s0 (N. S.), vol. 19, No. 4, 0. 226,
'there is someanafogy between the position of 'a'contract Within the Statute 6f
Frauds and a comnbn-law marriage not

ill atcordance'141tli tcEtihMri
Acts, or with the existing lex loci of aiiy
particular countrv.' It"was" hehd in a
recent case before the English High
Court of Justice, viz., Brittai v. Ros-

siter, 18 AM'. Law Ieg. (N. S., 716,
that a verbal contract was not rde
absolutely void 'by tha Statute of Frauds,
but was an existing contract, though not
enforceable. As was said on that occasion by BRETT, L. J., "There is a contract but no person can he 'charged upon
it in a court of law." And so in Leroux
v. Brown, 12 C. B. 801, JERVS, C. J.,

and MAULE, J., were of a clear opinion
that "a contract made in words, which
is within the 4th section of' the Statute
of Frauds, is not void because it has not
been reduced into writing, but only that
it cannot be enforced, nor anyihing depending on it, in any Engylsia court of
law." So, in the case of Brittain v.
Rossiter, CoTro-v, L. J., says, "I am
of opinion that under the statute the
verbal contract was an existing contract,
TiEsIGER,
but was not enforceable."

L. J., confirms this view: "I think it
clear that it is not void for all purposes,
and it is a real existing contract, though
not enforceable. *** When a contract
is not enforceable within the' Statute of
Frauds, it is still an existing contract."

To the same effect is Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mas . 325. "The statute
presupposes

an exi.ting lawful con-

tract; it affects the repiedy only-as
between the parties, and not the validity
So, a commonof the co tract itself."
law marriage, though not enforceable in
a particula country, as coming wi'ithin a
particular statute, may, nevertheless, be

not the less a marriage contract and
recognisable jinthe laTd.of the dom"de
of the parties, and indced all over the

world, with the exception -eferred to.
Buid yet thit conflict of law is the very
difficultv from' which the comitas or jus
genum' offers an escape,'otherwise, not
only every foreign nation, but every
separate state of the American Union
may have its own distinct lez domicilii,
which, unless of the most primitive cliaraster,' it may be iii"possible to carry
elsewhere, and if the lex loci is not to
prevail, there remains'no alterative but
that which proverbially terminates between the horns of a'dilcmma; 'for, in
the language of 'Sir C. CxsswELL,
"as far as the law'of nations is concerned, each country must have an equal
right to claim respeet for itsUaws. Both
'cannoi be observed."
The decision in this case may proba'bly'result in s'bnt legislative aciion 'by
.which recoid 'dr writtbn evidence of the
act may be required, or, it least, a ivit'ness of the transaction may be made 6n
essential ingredient, and thiis avoid the
andnal "of in eresfed unco roborated
testimoniy remaining unchallenged. It
would' indeed be quite impo'ssible for a
foreign country to make itself judicially
'acquainted with the matrimonial law of
domicile in 'every country and state
witlin' the einihof clristeihdom. Each
country can only insist upon the observince *ofits oxin law in its own country,
aid upon due compliance with the lez
loci must depend the recognition by that
country of the validity of the marriage
and the consequent I1gitima~y of the offspring. If the lex domicilii is made the
criterion in one country, and the lex loci
inanother, the conflict of law must resuit in ine.xtricable' confusion-a marriage deemid valid in one country
'bui invalid in ainother-children legitimiate in one cosntry but illegitimate in
anothei.
'Of course there are exceptions to every
le.- If the religion or the matrimonial
rites in any counfitry are such that they
cannot be complied with by citizens of
another country without doing a 'grdss
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violence to conscience, or without submitting to unreasonable and perhaps
degrading ceremonies and regulations,
an exception may and has been permitted
in favor of the application of the lex
domicilii: Ruding v. Smith, 2 Hagg.
Consis. Rep. 382; Scrinshire v. Scrimshire, Id. 395.
So also, perhaps, where the le loc is
disregarded, but not wilfully and knowingly: 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, ' 22. Such
might well arise between foreigners, but
if done fraudulently both parties must be
cognisant of the fraud under this statute
to vitiate the proceeding: Clowes v.
Olowes, 3 Curteis 185, Arches Court of
Canterbury 1842; Dormer v. Williams, I
Curteis 870; -ex v. Tibshelf, 1 B. &Ad.
195 ; Rex v. Wroxton, 4 Id. 640. Whether, under the latter circumstance-, the
substitution of the lex domicili for the
lex loci would, the act being bona fide, in
itself constitute a valid marriage by the
laws of the country of the lex loci contractus, we need not now consider, as the
question does not arise in the case before
us. Suffice it to say the common-law
marriage in England has never been
formally abolished, but its celebration
cannot be enforced by any court, nor
cognisance taken of it, except, perhaps,
under very peculiar circumstances, at
least as far as British subjects are concerned. Even in the case of a commonlaw marriage the presence of a person in
holy orders was always required: The
Queen v. Millis, 10 C1. & Fin. 655.
In the absence of any special legislation of any nation affecting vessels
flying its flag on the-high seas, the common law of marriage would appear to
be alone applicable - Philinore, p. 377.
Certainly the English statutes on- the
subject relate only to England and
Wales; the Irish to Ireland, and Scotland retains her common-law matrimonial jurisdiction. But as- in the case
before us the nationality of the vessel
was not proved, it is unnecessary to enter
into the question of the lex loci of any

particular nation, but we may add that
according to the English Merchant Shipping Act (1854) 17 & 18 Viet., c.
282: "Every master of a ship
104,
for which an official log-book is hereby
required, shall make or cause to be made
therein entries of the following matters
(that is to say)," inter alia, " every
marriage taking place on beard, with
the name and ages of the parties."
Although this requirement is merely directory and the master might probably
forfeit his certificate for any neglect in
this respect, it is to some extent a safeguard, bat it is questionable whether is
could be made so mandatory as to operate as a sine qua non in determining the
validity or invalidity of a marriage on
the "high seas," which, says Phillimore,
p. 377, "are not subject to the jurisdiction of any state."
At all events the. court, in the case
before us, determined that "this question
they need not decide," no nationality
having been proved. The English statute just referred to seems, however, to
contemplate the-possibility of a marriage
on the high seas, which, in the absence
of the requirements of the English marriage acts, can by no possibility be other
than a marriage at common law of the
most primitive kind, neither church,
chapel, clergyman, registrar, nor registrar's office being found on board merchant vessels. And yet it has been
deemed necessary to confirm by special
Act of Parliament marriages v-lieh have
been solemnized on board a British man
of war on any foreign station, even by a
minister in holy orders according to the
rites of the Church of England or Ireland,
or the United Church of England and
Ireland, or by a minister of the Church
of Scotland, and both or one of the parties being subjects or a subject of the
realm: 12 & 13 Viet., c. 68, 20.
There is an apparent differenco between the marriage law of Massachusetts
and that of New York. In Comuonwealth
v. ffunson, 127 Mass. 459, it wasdecided
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that a contract by words of present
import but not in the presence of a magistrate or minister, although followed by
cohabitation, was no marriage. As the
rules regulating marriage are the subject
of state and not federal legislation, the
conflict of laws though provoked abroad
may eventuate in confusion worse confounded at home.
A case recently decided in England,
Re Goodman's Trusts, 43 Law T.
Rep. (N. S.) p. 14, may, perhaps,

operate as a timely warning. It was
there held that a child, illegitimate according to English law, but who was
legitimate according to the laws of its
domicile and of its parent's domicile,
cannot take under the Statute of Distributions as one of the next of kin of an
intestate dying domiciled in England.
The word "children" in the Statute of
Distributions means children according
to the English law.
HUGH WEIGHTMAN.
New York.

Supreme' court of Pennsylvania.
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A grantor in a deed may avoid his conveyance by proof that he was non corpos
mentis at the time of its execution.
"It is not necessary :is a condition pretedent that there should- be an'offer to pug
the grantee in statu quo, for the ground upon which the decdof an insane man is held
voidable i; not only his incapacity to make a valid, sale,, bu also his incapacity
prudently to manage and dispose of the proceeds of the sale.
Whether the grantee upon disaffirmance by the griantor, can recover back the consideration paid, will depend on the circumstances and equities of the case.
To enable a man to avoid a deed made 1y'him wile insane; lfeh7 ay sue in his
own name and not by a committee, and he may prove'insanity on the'same' terms as
if he were defehdant in the action, and plaintiffweye supporting his case -with the
same deed. If at the trial he should appear insane, the court will treat him and
his cause as it would any other plaintiff suffering under a like malady.

At the trial, plaintiff having proved title in him
in evidence a deed from plaintiff to him and
put
defendant
self,
rested. Plaintiff then offered ,to prove that he was insane at the
time he signed the deed, -that defendant knew. of his insanity, and
that the bargain was unconscionable. and unfair, Objected to, as
introducing a defence inadmissible 'againsb plaintiff's deed, viz., the
defence of insanity; also, because- the offer was not full enough, in
that before plaintiff .can avoid the deed, he. must -prove that he has
offered to restore to defendant what he paid-, for the property.
. ..
-"
Objection sustained., Exception. : and
judgment
court,
of
the
direction
by
defendant
Verdict for
thereon; whereupon plaintiff took this writ, assigning for error the
action of the court in excluding the evidence aforesaid..
EJECTMENT.
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Sittser and Harding, for plaintiff in erroi.-The
principle
that a man shall not be heard to
advanced by Littleton and Coke,
stultify himself, has been properly exploded as being manifestly
absurd and against natural justice: 2 Kent's Com. 451; Warden
v. .Echbaum, 14 Penn. St. 121; Bensell v. Chancellor, 5 Whart.
371; Cook v. Parker, 4 Phila. 265. '.ihe court, in rejecting
our offer to show insanity at the time of signing the deed with
notice of the insanity to' defendant, swept away our offer to show
that the deed was procured by fraud.
. B. p C. A. Little and TV. Mf. Piatt & Sons, for defendant
in error.-None of plaintiff's authorities go to the extreme length
of allowing a recovered lunatic in a" legal action of ejectment to
destroy his own indenture. It should be by bill in equity, wherein
defendant would have, nQtice of the facts and claims against him,
and time in which to prepare his evidence. - The committee must
be joined as plaintiff: Uberoth v. Bank, 9 Phila. 83. Otherwise who would vouch ihai the lunatic will not aferwards disaffirm
his disaffirmance? - As to the offer to show fraud, it is insufficient,
ii that it stands unconnected with an offer to prove a tender to
restore to defendantf his purchase-money: Pearsollv. Chapin, 44
Penn. St. 9; M arow v.Rees, 69 Id. 868.
-

The opinioe of the ,court was delivered by
TRUNKE, J.-As -the case comes, it presents these questions:
1. Can a'plaintiff, who brings suit by himself, prove his insanity
to defeat his deed given in evidence by the defendant? 2. Can he
prove that the defendant knew of the insanity when he took the
deed ? 8. May he show the deed was procured by fraud? and, 4.
Must he restore the consideration-before bringing suit?
It is~a general rule that a grant6r in a deed may avoid his conveyance by proof that he was non eompos mentis at the time of
its execution : Bensell v. Chancellor, 5 Whart. 371; 2 Kents
Com. 451 - Gibom v. Soper, 6 Gray 279. Like the deed of an
infant, a lunatic's deed -may be ratified and confirmed. Where
there is no 'evidence of ratification after restoration to reason, it-isimpossible upon legal principles that the estate passed to the grantee
in the deed. An insane person- is incapable of making a valid
'deed, for he wants -the consenting mind. "The law makes this
very incapacity of parties their shield. In their weakness they
find protection It will not suffer 'those of mature age and sound
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mind to profit by that weakness. It binds the strong while it protects the weak., It holds the adult to the bargain which the infant
may avoid; the sane to the obligation from which the insane may
be loosed. It does not mean to put them on an equality. On the
other hand, it intends that he who deals with infants or insane persons shall do it at' his peril; nor is there practically any hardship
in this, for men of sound minds seldom unwittingly enter into contracts with infants or insane persons:" Gibson v. Soper, supra.
In Molten v. Canmroux, 2 Exeh. 487, an. a:etion to recover money
paid for annuities, it was held, that, when a person apparently of
sound. mind, and not known to be, otherwise, enters into s contract
for the purchase of property, which is fair and bona fide, and
which is executed and completed, and daid property has been paid
for and enjoyed, and cannot be restored so as to put the parties in
statt quo, such contract cannot afterwards be set aside, either by
the alleged lunatic or those who represent him. ,Like doctrine prevailed in Beals.v. ,ee, 10 Penn. St. 56. The decision in Laancaster
t-,ational"
,you
Bank.v. Alloore,.78 Penn. St. 407, rests on the
same principle; there was neither fraud nor krii"wledge of he
insanity. -. Without inconsistency, in Mfoore v. Ierhey,,7 Weekly
Notes (Phila ) 478, it was ruledthat it is-competent, in an action by an
endorsee of a note made by a lunatic, for thfelunatic to defend, 'either
by showing that the endorsee had knowledge of the lunacy, or that
the note was originally obtained fraudulently' or without proper
consideration. PAxSON, J., said: "I know of'no case in which it
has been held that a lunatic, when sued upon his contract, may not
show want of consideration.?' After speaking of' the rule which
had been urged-in favor of the plaintiff, he adds: _" We place our
ruling upon the broad ground that the principle of: commercial law'
above referred-; to does, not apply to the case of-commercial paper
made by madmen.", In Elliot v: Ince, 7 DeG., M. & G. 475,
487, it is said that, Molton, v. Carnroux. was called a decision of
necessity, and it is suggested that the same principle might apply,
to sales of Jand or mortgages. . 3 ut in this country that rule is not
universally, extended to sales of p.ersonalty,-and is.not applied to
conveyances of real estate.. "owever,.on that principle, or the
one in Bensell v. O]lanee7lor, the offered testimony was admissible
for the purpose of avoiding the de.ed..
The defendant urged that the plaintiff did not propose to show
he had recovered his reason, and, upon the truth of his offer, the
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law presumes he continues insane; wherefore he cannot maintain
the action and allege his insanity. Under the general issue in
assumpsit, the defendant may show in avoidance of the contract that
he was insane at the making of it. If he continues a lunatic, he
may not appear and plead by attorney, and if it so appears on
examination, the plea by attorney may; before judgment, be treated
as a nullity and a guardian be appointed, who will be entitled to
plead de novo: Mitchell v. Kingman, 5 Pick. 431. So when a
plaintiff is met by a deed, good on its face, he may avoid it by proof
that he was insane when it was executed. If his reason has been
restored he has no other means of protection. A committee cannot
be appointed for a sane man because he was at one time a lunatic.
He must bring suit himself to recover his rights, and may prove
insanity to avoid a deed set up against him on the same terms as
if he were defendant in the action, and the plaintiff were supporting
his case with the same deed. The principle contended for by the
defendant would deprive a man, who had been non compos mentis,
of remedy for recovery of his property, without fault on his part,
and might work his utter ruin. If, at the trial, he should appear
to- be insane, the court would treat him and his cause as it would
any other plaintiff suffering under like malady.
2. From the foregoing, it is manifest, that it is competent to
prove the defendant had knowledge of the insanity when he took
the deed. If unnecessary for its avoidance, it may be material on
the question of restoration of the consideration. He who knowingly deals with a madman takes the risk of losing.
3. For like reason it may be proved that the deed was procured
by fraud. Even the holderof negotiable paper may fail to recover
because the maker was insane, when, but for that, there could be
no defence to his action on the ground of fraud or want of proper
consideration. Proof that the bargain was unfair and unconscionable would be pertinent in determining the equitable claims of
the defendant.
4. The consideration need not be restored before commencement
of the action, nor after, in all cases. To, say that an insane man
before he can avoid a voidable deed must put the grantor in statu
quo, would oftentimes be to say his deed shall not be avoided at all.
The more insane the grantor was when the deed was made, the
less likely will he be to retain the fruits of his bargain so as to be
able to make restitution. One of the obvious grounds on which
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the deed of an insane man is held- voidable is, not merely the incapacity to make a valid sale, but the incapacity prudently to manage
and dispose of the proceeds of the sale. And the same incapacity,
which made the deed void, may have wasted the price, and made
the restoration of the consideration impossible: G-ibson v. Soper,
supra. In that case the defendant contended there could be no
recovery, because restitution had not been offeied; and thereupon
the plaintiff proposed, if anything was due, to make such restoration and repayment in such way and manner as the court should
direct. The question was, as it is here, whether restoration
is a condition precedent to recovery, and not whether under any
circumstances a grantee after avoidance of the deed may recover
back a part or the whole of the price paid? It is said, that, if the
grantor having been restored to sound mind still retains and uses
the consideration of the deed without offer to restore, or seeks to
enforce the securities or avail himself of the contract which constituted such consideration, such conduct may furnish satisfactory and,
it may be, conclusive evidence of a ratification. That would be an
entirely different case from one where the grantor wasted the price
he received before his reason was restored. Although the deed has
has not been ratified, and consequently the plaintiff is entitled to
recover the land, should it appear that in equity the whole or a part
of the consideration ought to be restored or repaid, under the
practice in this state, there would be no difficulty in doing justice
between the parties by a conditional verdict and judgment.
Judgment reversed, and venire facia8 de novo awarded.
The most interesting point in the principal case is, that an insane person can
avoid his deed without first tendering the
consideration, or paying back the benefits
his estate may have received from the
purchase.
The learned judge cites with approval
Beals v. See, 10 Barr 56 ; Lancaster
Bank v. Moore, 28 P. F. Smith 407,
and Moore v. Hershey, f Weekly Notes
of Cases (Phila.) 478, all of which
cases turned upon the fact of knowledge of the insanity, or want of good
faith on the part of the opposite party,
and yet, in deciding that the consideradon need not be restored before bringing suit, if at all, quote largely, from
VOL. XXIX.-9

Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray 281, a case
which certainly is not law. The language is perhaps a little unguarded, but
all that the court seem to have meant
is, that where fraud had been practised
on the lunatic, or the grantee knew of
his infirmity, then, in such case, the
consideration need not be restored at
alL; but that even in other cases th2
restitution or offer to restore the grantee
to the status quo is not a condition precedent to the action, but that the equities
may be adjusted after suit brought.
The rule as laid down in every case
on the subject, except Gibson v, Soper,
is, that where the opposite party acted
without knowledge of the insanity of
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the grantor, in good faith, and for a
valuable consideration, the deed cannot
be rescinded without placing the parties
n statu quo, and, if that cannot be done,
neither the lunatic, his committee, nor
his heirs can avoid it at all, but the deed
must stand.
In Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray (Mass.)
281 (1856, THoxAs, J.), the coitrt says:
"This is a writ of entry brought for the
demandant by his probate guardian to
recover a farm. * * * The tenant claimed
title under a deed of the demandant.
* * * The demandant replied that at
the time of the making and delivery of
the deed, he was an insane man. * **
The position taken by the tenant is,
that the grantor, or his guardian, or
heirs, cannot avoid the grant mless he
or they place the grantee, in all respects
in the condition in which he was before
the deed. It seems to us, upon careful
consideration, that such is not the rule
of law ; that the restitution of the consideration of the deed, or purchasemoney is not a condition precedent to the
recovery of the land. * * * The more
insane the grantor was when the deed
was made, the less likely will he be to
retain the fi-uits of his bargain, so as to
be able to make restitution. * * * If
the law required restitution of the price,
as a condition precedent to the recovery
of the estate, that would be done indirectly which the law does not permit to
be done directly; and the great purpose
of the law in avoiding such contracts,
the protection of those who cannot protect themselves, defeated. The insane
grantor could not avoid the deed of his
estate, because the same folly which induced the sale, had wasted the proceeds;
the result against which it is the policy
of the' law to guard." There was no
evidence of bad faith or knowledge of
ihe infirmity on part of grantee, the
court evidently not considering that good
faith, &c., made any difference in a contract with an insane persdn.

Now, the case of Gibson v. Sopar,
supra, stands alone, as every case bearing upon the particular point in question, is given below, and all arrive at
an entirely different conclusion, supporting the rule given above.
In _Itzgerald v. Reed, 9 S. & M. 94
Miss. (1847,) the court (CLAxroN,.J.,)
says: "This is a bill to rescind a contract upon the ground of mental incapacity of the complainant. * * * * In
rescinding the contract, however, the
courts ought to place the parties in the
situation they respectively occupied before it was entered into, or nearly as
practicable, whatever benefit the lunatic
or his estate may have received in consequence of his contract must be given
up."
So also in Carr v. Holliday, 5 Ired.
Eq. (N. C.) 167, (1847)-, the court
(NsH, J.,) says: "The bill seeks to rescind certain contracts entered into be
tween the intestate, Robert Carr, and thE
defendant. (A reference had been made
to a master to determine what benefit the
lunatic's estate had received.) "The
master reports that the plaintiff cannot
make restoration to the defendant of any
property so purchased by him; that the
contracts were made in good faith,
without any knowledge of Robert Carr
* * * the court will not deprive him
(the defendant) of the advantages he
has obtained without restoring to him
whatever benefit the estate of.the lunatic
has received in consequence of the contract. This we are informed cannot be
done. The bill must be dismissed with

costs."t
So in Eaton v. Eaton, 8 Vroom (37
N. J.) 108, (1874). In this case one
of the parties claimed title to the land in
dispute by virtue of a deed made to him
by his father (deceased). It was attacked on the ground of insanity on the
part of the grantor at the time of making
the grant. The court (ScuDDER, J.),
commenting on Gibson v. Soper, mTq ,
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say, "This is good law where there is
fraud practised upon one who is known
at the time to be insane, but it is not the
law where the purchase and conveyance
are made in good faith, for a good consideration, and without knowledge of
the insanity; not only must the consideration be returned in such cases before
the conveyance will be avoided, bat
courts of equity and courts of law have
gone further, and held that where persons apparently of sound mind, and not
known to be otherwise, enter into a
contract which is fair and bona fide, and
which is executed and completed, and
the property, the subject-matter of the
contract, cannot be restored so as to put
the parties in statu quo, such contract
cannot be set aside either by the alleged
lunatic or those who represent him."
So again in Scanlan v. Cobb, 17 Am.
Law Reg. (N. S.) 305; s. c. 85 Ill.
297. In this case Thomas Cobb, guardian of Mrs. Fanny Hendricks, a lunalc, filed his bill in the court below,
praying for a decree setting aside a deed
executed by his ward to Scanlan for a lot
of ground, * * * on the ground that
she was insane at the time. The answer
made was, that Scanlan was a purchaser
in good faith for full value, without any
notice that Mrs. Hendricks was insane.
The court below set the deed aside,
ordering Scanlan to account for the
rents, &c. Scanlan appealed.
The
court (Scuo
ErsLD,
J.), delivering the
opinion, say, * * * "The evidence is
clear that Scanlan had no personal
knowledge that Mrs. Hendricks was insane. He negotiated with Van Wormer,
who was acting under a power of attorney, * * * and Van Wormer not only
failed to coummunicate to Scanlan that
Mrs. Hendricks was insane, but he persists that she was perfectly sane, both
when she executed the power of attorney
to him and when she acknowledged the
deed to Scanlan. Scanlan having acted
in good faith, and without culpable negligence, is, upon the clearest principle

of justice and morality, entitled, at all
events, to be reimbursed that which he
has paid, and which Mrs. Hendricks has
had the benefit of. There is no more
reason, in good morals, why a lunatic
should not pay his or her debts, lawfully
contracted, or those which are clearly
and unquestionably contracted for a
lunatic, than why a sane person should
not; and it is equitable and right that
a person paying such debts for the
lunatic, under an honest belief that he
was legally obligated so to do, although
it turns out he was mistaken as to the
obligation resting upon him, should be
reimbursed. * ** The English doctrine, and that recognised generally by
the courts in this country, is, where a
purchase from an insane person is made,
and a conveyance obtained in good faith,
for a sufficient consideration and without
knowledge of the insanity, the consideration must be returned before the conveyance will be avoided. And the courts
have gone further, and held, that where
persons apparently of sound mind, and
not known by the adverse party to be
otherwise, enters into a contract which
is fair and bona fide, and which is executed and completed, and the property
which is the subject of the contract cannot be restored so as to put the parties
in statu quo, such contracts cannot be set
aside, either by the alleged lunatic or
those who represent him."
To the same effect, are Young v.
Stevens, 48 N. H. 133 (1868); Loomis
v. Spencer, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 153 (1830) ;
Sprague v. Dud, 1 Id. 480 ; Mohr v.
Tulip, 40 Wis. 66 (1876) ; Nichol v.
Thomas, 53 Ind. 42 ; N¥iel v. 3Morley,
9 Vesey, Jr., 478 (1804); Beavan v.
31cDonnell, 9 Exch. 309.
See also, as to contracts being binding on lunatics, if made in good faith
and without knowledge of the insanity:
Molten v. Camroux, 2 Exch. 487 ; PRice
v. Berrington, 15 Jurist 999 ; La Rue
v: Gilkyson, 4 Barr 375 ; Beals v. Lee,
10 Id. 56.; LancasterBank v. JMoore, 28
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P. F. Smith 407; Moore v. Hershey,
7 Weekly Notes of Cases (Phila.) 478.
As to contracts of lunatics being void,

v. (J6b
or voidable, &c., see &anls
17 Am. L. Reg. 305 (note); also most
of above cases.
GEo. W. REED

United States Circuit Court, District of New Jersey.
If RE THE SCHOONER ELIZA B. EMORY AND WEEKS, MASTER.
The majority in interest of the owners of a vessel have the absolute right to
remove the master, whether he be a part owner or not, and to resume possession
of such vessel at their own pleasure.
As against one who is master merely, this power may be exercised without cause
and in violation of the contract engaging him.
In the case of a part owner, only a written agreement, entitling such part owner
to possession, under sect. 4250 of the Revised Statutes, can defeat the exercise
of such right.
A contract for the sale of a "sailing right" by the part owner of a vessel is not
susceptible of specific enforcement, either by way of estoppel or by a direct proceeding for that purpose.
The only remedy for a breach of such contract, if any, is an action for damages.

APPEAL by libellants from the decree of the District Court in
admiralty. The decree of the court below is reported in 19 Am.
Law Reg., N. S., 571.
Henry -Randersand S. B. Grey, for libellants.
J. Warren Coul8ton and if. B. -Edmunds,for claimants.
McKuNNAN, C. J.-The libellants represent the majority in interest of the owners of the schooner Eliza B. Emory, and have brought
this suit to obtain possAssion of the vessel. It is not denied that,
under ordinary circumstances, this right will be enforced against
the minority interest in a vessel in favor of the majority, but it is
contended that John B. Clayton, whose interest must be united
with that of the other libellants to make up a majority of the pro-prietary shares of the vessel, is estopped from asserting his right
as owner, and that therefore a majority of the owners is not represented in the libel.
John B. Clayton was one of the original owners of the Eliza B.
Emory, and sailed her for some time as master. In April 1873,
Clayton sold to Weeks, the respondent, one-sixteenth, for $1750, as
a "sailing right of the vessel," and executed a bill of sale in the
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ordinary form for the sixteenth part of the vessel. Weeks ws
of
then mate, took command, and sailed the vessel until the filing
considerwas
sixteenth
a
of
value
this libel. It is alleged that the
real value
ably below $1750, and that the difference between the
of the
consideration
the
was
of such interest and the sum paid
having
Clayton,
B.
"sailing right." Hence it is urged that John
gainsay
subsequently acquired another interest in the vessel, cannot
ground
only
The
the right of Weeks to retain possession of her.
found
be
upon which an estoppel can be supported, if at all, is to
in the testimony of Weeks, which is to the effect that Clayton
offered to sell him one-sixteenth "as a sailing right of the vessel,"
and that he bought that interest at more than it was worth, because
right;"
he understood that he was thereby acquiring the "sailing
would
he
sixteenth
a
bought
or, in other words, that if Weeks
to sail
and
vessel,
the
of
thereby acquire a right to the possession
the
within
fact
a
of
her as master. Now this is not the statement
existence
its
of
knowledge of one 'party upon whose representation
the other party relied and was misled, but it was the statement of
judga legal result as to which both parties might form their own
ment, as they had like means of information respecting it. Weeks
must be presumed to have known that the legal right to the possession and control of the vessel pertained to the majority interest
from
in her, and that he could acquire the right to sail her only
doctrine
the
invoke
to
then,
this interest. He is not in a position,
of estoppel, because, if he has made a futile contract, with his eyes
loss by
wide open, he cannot secure indemnity for a consequent
an unauthorized retention of the vessel.
Indefinite as is the testimony of Weeks, I think that, when the
whole of the evidence is considered, it imports only an agreement,
at the time of the purchase by Weeks, that he should succeed
it is
Clayton in command of the vessel. Clayton so testifies, and
he says that
not without support in the testimony of Weeks, when
recollect
not
did
but
her,"
in
"go
should
Clayton agreed that he
illusory
the
that
probable
than
what he said. I think it is more
Clayton
Accordingly,
"sailing right" hath this extent, no more.
turned over the possession of the vessel to Weeks, who sailed her
thereafter as master, with the acquiescence of the other owners.
for
He thus got all he bargained for, and is without justification
his detention of the vessel.
The absolute right of the owners of a vessel to displace the
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master, and so reclaim possession of it, is so well settled now as to
be incontestable. It rests upon reasons of public policy which are
peculiarly applicable to that species of property. It may be
exercised without cause, even against a master, in -violation of the
contract engaging him. Thus, in Montgomery v. The Owners of
the General Greene, Bee 388, Judge HOPKINSON affirmed the
right of the owners to dismiss, at their pleasure, a master who
had been employed for a particular voyage, whose cargo was on
board, for which he had signed bills of lading, and who was all
ready and just about to sail. In affirming the decree, the High
Court of Errors and Appeals, say (Montgomery v. Henry, 1 Dall.
51), "As to the other point, the dismission of the captain, we are
of opinion that, upon a general retainer for no particular voyage,
the captain may be dismissed at any time without cause assigned;
but that where there is a charter-party, bills of lading, and a
particular voyage agreed upon, though the owners may dismiss the
captain, yet they would be liable in a common-law court."
But the master here is also a part owner. Does that give him
any better right to hold the vessel than he would otherwise have?
A decisive answer is furnished by sect. 4250 of the Revised
Statutes. It is there enacted that the majority ownership of a
vessel shall have the same power to remove a master, who is also
part owner, as such majority, if owners, have to remove a master
not an owner; but that they "shall not apply where there is a
valid written agreement subsisting, by virtue of which such master
would be entitled to possession."
This not only confers upon a majority of owners the absolute
power to remove a part owner from the command and possession
of a vessel, because such power is exercisable by them against one
who is not an: owner, but by the clearest implication it enacts that
nothing but a written agreement, entitling a part owner to possession, shall be available against this right of the majority. Now,
if such a contract in its most comprehensive aspect, as is alleged
be
'here, had been set up, against all the libellants, would it not
the
to
right
their
defeat
to
clearly insufficient, under the statutes,
control and possession of the vessel? Can it, then, have any
greater effect against only one of them? Obviously, such a discrimination has not the slightest.
It results, therefore:
1 That the majority (in interest) of the owners of a vessel have

